The New REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

VOLUME XXXVIII NEW YORK, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19, 1924 NUMBER 485

Contents

The Week 80

Editorials
- President Coolidge and Edward McLean..... 84
- Peace without Victory in the Coal Industry.... 86
- Oil and the A. P..... 87
- The Problem of the Smith Candidacy..... 87

General Articles
- Are the Republicans a Party?..John W. Owens 89
- Radio Politics.....Eunice Fuller Barnard 91
- The Treasury and Interest Rates..... David Friday 93
- "Bello Bello".....Aldous Huxley 95
- Poems (Verse).....Hazel Conkling 96

The Sargent Exhibition.....Stark Young 97

Snowfall (Verse).....Stephen Vincent Benét 98

Correspondence 98

Reviews of Books
- An Introduction to Social Psychology..... Melville J. Herskovits 101
- Wallace Stevens and E. E. Cummings..... Edmund Wilson 102
- Plutarch Lied ..... X 103
- Episodes Before Thirty.....Henry B. Fuller 104
- Conflicts with the Code....Katharine Anthony 104
- Some Books on Art.....L. M. 106

The Week

RARELY have we read in a daily newspaper a more disingenuous and misleading article than the dispatch from Washington which the New York Times of March 10 carried on the last column of its first page. This article is supposed to give an account of the attitude of "public sentiment" towards "the prevailing tendency to tear down honorable reputations." According to this account "visitors to the Capitol testify that the people back home are disgusted with the conditions of affairs here as disclosed by the evidence before the Teapot Dome Committee and the mass of unofficial accusation and rumor that has accompanied these revelations. They feel, it is said, that official Washington is not merely impregnated with corruption but saturated with it. They have little respect for public men generally, classing them all as selfish and corrupt politicians. They have lost confidence in the integrity of Congress and have a low opinion of the intelligence of the people's representatives in Senate and House" but particularly in the Senate. "At the same time this lack of confidence does not apply to President Coolidge. Although "the titular chief of a party of some of whose leaders the people are suspicious" the President is generally considered to be "the bulwark of the interests of the people." The politicians who attack him for his relationship with McLean inspire only "resentment," and this resentment increases "the lack of confidence in the Senate."

THE article from which the foregoing extracts are borrowed is a perfect example of the tendencious and misleading treatment of the news which is becoming the great fault of contemporary American journalism. While pretending to give an account of how public opinion feels towards the Washington exposures, and while pretending to deplore the disposition to tear down honorable reputations, it is really pro-Coolidge propaganda disguised as news, and it really seeks to increase and to turn against the senatorial investigators the suspicious and credulous state of mind which it deplores in the case of other "honorable reputations." The purpose of this propaganda is only too clear. It is intended to discredit those senators who are conducting the investigation. Its authors apparently expect that, by making people suspicious of Senator Walsh and his associates, the President will be relieved from the criticism and the suspicions caused by his own acts.

THE friends of the President are in our opinion doing him a doubtful service when they disparage the actions of the Public Lands Committee of the Senate as part of an effort to promote the Coolidge candidacy. Such propaganda is almost a confession that the Walsh investigation is disquieting, repellent and probably injurious to the administration. But that is not the point. If the Times really believes that official life in Washington under a Republican administration is "saturated" with corruption and that from this state of facts it can derive a valid argument in favor of a continuation of a Republican President in power and against the investigators of official Republican corruption, there is no reason, except a respect for its own reputation for common sense, why it should not say as much in its editorial columns.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But there is every reason why as an honest newspaper it should not impute this pernicious nonsense to "public sentiment."

MORE congressional investigations are now in progress or planned than would ordinarily be expected in a decade. The New York World listed eleven the other day which are now being conducted by the Senate alone. They are: One, the oil scandal, two, the investigation of Daugherty and the Department of Justice, three, the Borah inquiry into Hughes's allegations of Russian revolutionary propaganda, four, the Reed investigation of propaganda in general, five, the Veterans' Bureau inquiry, six, the report on the Ku Klux Klan-controlled election in Texas, seven, the study of the Shipping Board's activities, eight, the investigation of land frauds in the Rio Grande valley, nine, investigation of the Foulke fur seal contract, ten, a study of rent profiteering in the District of Columbia, and eleven, the Copeland inquiry into "fake diploma mills." Other investigations are being urged in the cases of the railroad administration, federal prohibition enforcement, the cost of bread and flour, the economic effects of the bonus, and the income taxes paid by the principals in the oil scandal.

A SINGLE one of these investigations, that of the Brookhart Committee into the affairs of Daugherty, will have no less than four important aspects. First is the charge that the Doheny and Sinclair oil interests and former Secretary Fall aided, if they did not instigate, the de la Huerta revolution in Mexico. Second comes the allegation that Department of Justice agents on the Mexican border were ordered by Washington not to halt illegal gun-running across the border. Third is the story that oil interests in Oklahoma offered their support to General Leonard Wood in the 1920 campaign if he would make Jake Hamon (afterward murdered by Clara Hamon) Secretary of the Interior. This is also to be the subject of a separate investigation by representatives of President Coolidge. Fourth is the story of attempted bribery of Daugherty and other federal officials, made public in connection with recent indictments of Gaston B. Means, former Agent of the Department of Justice, and Thomas B. Felder. If the public is able to keep all these various investigations straight, to sift the evidence as reported, and to act upon the conclusions implicit in that evidence, then the unkind words of the intelligence testers about our average mental age will be forever set at naught.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL DAUGHERTY has remained in office for weeks after it was apparent that every leader of his party wished him to retire. President Coolidge, in fact, by his failure to rid himself of the incubus, may even have lost the nomination which was so certainly his a few weeks ago. Mr. Daugherty bases his refusal to retire on a demand for fair play, asserting that his private honor is incompatible with a resignation which would be interpreted as a confession of guilt. If his connection with the oil scandal were the one count in the indictment against Mr. Daugherty, the New Republic would admit the justification for his plea and would join the protest against "lynch law." But the oil scandal is only the latest of a long series of events which in our judgment have demonstrated his unfitness for office.

AT the time of his selection we recorded our belief that by personality and experience he was unfit for the task; and every day of his tenure in office has confirmed that belief. His use of the injunction to aid employers in labor disputes, his utter failure to take effective action in the Veterans' Bureau cases and the Shipping Board and surplus war material scandals, his clumsy failure in the sugar profiteering cases, have all stamped him as unfit. He should have resigned as soon as President Coolidge took office; he ought even now to resign at once, and spare himself the humiliation, with which he is threatened as we go to press, of being ejected from office. His private honor can be as triumphantly vindicated by a Senate investigation of him as a private citizen as of a man clinging desperately to a place which he never should have filled and from which the whole nation agrees he should at once retire.

THE spectacular decline in the franc has revived old fears that the franc would go the way of the mark, the Austrian crown and the ruble. While everything seems to be possible in finance, the probabilities are against such an outcome. East of the Rhine indemnities and revolution made anything like a sound financial system impossible. The maximum taxes that could be collected fell far short of meeting the necessary drains upon the treasury. Paper money was resorted to simply as a form of taxation which did not require bayonets for collection. France today is economically sound. Her citizens are quite able to pay taxes enough to cover the necessary expenses of government, provided the burden of debt is sufficiently lightened. A lightening goes on automatically with the depreciation of the franc. With the franc at four cents the domestic debt is under $12,000,000,000 in gold, at three cents, under $9,000,000,000. Before the war the French debt was $6,000,000,000 in gold, and at that time the value of gold was fifty percent higher than it is today. Accordingly, if the franc were to be stabilized at three cents France would have relieved herself practically of her entire war debt. Plainly there is no fundamental financial reason why the franc should remain long at so low a level as that.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

YET fundamental factors count only in the long run. For any short period of time the course of an unsecured currency like the French is unpredictable. The fall of the franc by more than a fifth of its value in a single week was bound to produce a serious currency shortage. It takes more currency to do business in the higher prices resulting from the fall in the standard. The banks, therefore, are under pressure to issue more currency, with the result of a further depreciation and the need of still more currency. This process, if unchecked, can carry a currency to almost any depths. In a country like France, however, where the whole population, practically, invests in government bonds, no political regime can stand which permits the government credit to go entirely to smash. A financial dictator is pretty sure to appear long before people begin to count their small change in trillions of francs.

PRESIDENT COOLIDGE'S letter to the Filipinos on the subject of independence combines some good sense with some particularly cruel and unwise nonsense. He asserts that "a very large proportion and possibly a majority of the substantial citizenry" of the islands are not seeking independence. He declares that our "protectorate" increases the financial and economic strength of the Philippines. He believes the islands are not ready for independence, points out the cost of a diplomatic service, an army and a navy, and solemnly assures the Filipinos that if they had been free during the World War their country would have been gobbled up. He whitewashes General Leonard Wood as completely as possible and says bluntly that until the Filipinos learn to get along with him, they may expect neither complete independence nor any further steps in that direction. There will be plenty of good Americans who may agree with the President about the impracticability of complete independence for the Philippines at this moment who will regard this insistence on forcing General Wood down the islanders' throats as being as unwise as it is monstrously unjust.

BY the President's proclamation the duty on wheat has been raised from thirty cents to forty-two cents a bushel. The ground for this action is that, according to the Tariff Commission, it costs forty-two cents more to produce wheat in the United States than in Canada, the chief competing country. This may be true, although it is a difficult problem to determine the cost of an agricultural product part of which comes from good land and part from bad; part from lands skimmed with the minimum expenditure and part from lands cultivated intensively at great expense per unit of production. But this is a difficulty the Tariff Commission must encounter every time it tries to determine the difference between domestic costs and foreign costs. It is an unworkable basis for the rational regulation of trade. No matter whether lowest costs, average costs or highest costs are taken as a basis of comparison, the results are fluctuating and obscure. The objective of protection, the establishing of a scale of domestic prices under which a well managed concern can live and do business, may be attained much more easily by simply watching the domestic price level and making the necessary adjustments to it.

IN the case of wheat there is an additional absurdity in attempting to apply the principle of comparative costs. Canada is the chief competing country, but her competition makes itself felt not in our market but in the European markets, which are entirely out of reach of our customs. The price of wheat goes up or down for Canada and the United States alike according to the condition of European demand. On the day when the twelve cent increase in duty was proclaimed wheat actually rose on the Chicago market by about half a cent. It rose, however, not because of the President's action, but because Great Britain and Italy bought 2,000,000 bushels. As it happened, they bought, not United States wheat, but Canadian. Wheat is wheat, and the farmers of Canada and of the United States must prosper or starve together, so long as both countries are heavy exporters. It may be that some farmers are sufficiently obtuse to believe that the customs line between the two countries makes a difference. But the majority of them must have become wiser, by this time.

WHEN the government offers amnesty to political prisoners, does it mean what it says? The question is a fair one in view of the plight of seventeen members of the I. W. W. who are about to be deported after having received "executive clemency." All these men were convicted during the war for expression of belief and opinion; none of them was convicted for any act of violence against person or property. Eminent jurists who have looked into their cases believe that they never should have been sentenced at all. Being aliens, they are to be deported though all of them have lived in the United States for many years. Secretary Davis alone has the power to suspend the deportation order. We earnestly hope that he will live up to the opportunity for justice which is here presented to him.

IN 1873 Anthony Comstock sought and secured from Congress legislation preventing the dissemination through the mails and otherwise of obscene matter. Through an inadvertence, so the Voluntary Parenthood League maintains, the statute when drawn included as obscene all information regarding birth control. A bill has now been introduced in the Senate by Albert B. Cummins of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Iowa, and in the House by William N. Vaile, of Colorado, repairing Mr. Comstock's error and removing the Federal ban on literature describing such birth control methods as are endorsed by reputable physicians. Passage of the Cummins-Vaile bill would permit the free transmission of birth control information in twenty-four states which are without legislation of their own; and would greatly aid the effort to secure the repeal of mediaeval legislation on this subject in the other twenty-four. We take it for granted that no intelligent American any longer needs to have the merits of this question argued at length If you believe in the right of children to be well born into happy homes where they can be properly reared, you can help to realize this ideal by writing to your congressmen and senators, and particularly to the members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, in support of the measure.

POLITICS and religion are conflicting, with a vengeance, in the Mohammedan world. Mustapha Kemal's Angora government has overthrown Abdul Medjid as Caliph and exiled him. His temporal powers had already been taken away, when the Sultanate was abolished in November, 1922, and Abdul was raised to the post of spiritual leader of the Mohammedan world. The new action means that the westernized Turks at Angora, weary of the reactionary plots which have centred about the Caliphate, intend to put into that office an individual more amenable to their own desires. These plans, of course, may miscarry. Already there are several non-Turkish contenders for the position who, cynical Near Eastern observers declare, represent the British and French governments, jockeying for a position of advantage in the Mohammedan world. King Hussein, of the British-controlled Hedjaz, a lineal descendent of Mohammed, and ruler of Mecca and Medina, the sacred cities, has already been declared Caliph by his two sons. A "French" candidate is the Sultan of Morocco. King Faud of Egypt, the Amir of Afghanistan and Aga Khan, of the Sunni of India are also on the list. While the selection of King Hussein would suit British policy in the Near East very well, the fact that other candidates are also from British-controlled territory makes it likely that the traditional imperial policy of "hands off" in religious matters will be maintained.

IF newspapers and magazines employed no staffs of professional writers, but depended on volunteer contributions from the public, you would have a situation in journalism like that which afflicts radio broadcasting today. The material which is put "on the air" now comes almost entirely from persons with an axe to grind—musicians and speakers who are seeking publicity for themselves, or paid propagandists, commercial and political. That is the chief reason why the great mass of what the radio listener hears is stuff on which no intelligent person can care to waste his time. At best it is inane; at worst it consists of the political and economic doctrines of those hundred-percenters who are the natural allies of big corporations such as rule in this field today. A better example of the evils of unaided private enterprise could hardly be sought. Here is a potential means of education and entertainment of the highest possible value, which is given over to fourth-rate minds because no one, generally speaking, now supports broadcasting except the manufacturers of receiving apparatus. Even they, it is expected, will withdraw if their market reaches a not improbable saturation point. On the whole, such a development would be desirable; for the way would then be clear for radio to attain the real usefulness to which its series of remarkable inventions opened the door.

THE road of progress, however, is certainly not that which the American Telephone and Telegraph Company is now pursuing in its effort to control all broadcasting through its patents on the necessary apparatus — action which would dismantle ninety percent of the present broadcasting stations. Secretary Hoover properly points out that its success would be comparable to control of the entire press of the country by a single corporation. Judging by its own present policy, the plan of the A. T. and T. appears to be to supplant present propaganda with plain advertising where the air will be owned successively by those able to pay for it at the rate of ten dollars a minute. This is already being done in the cases of some individuals broadcasting through the powerful A. T. and T. station, WEAF. Such a development, of course, would be even more ruinous to the industry than a continuation of the present chaos. It would "close the air" definitely to every statement of a political or economic nature not of an ultra-conservative character, unless made by an individual who could afford to pay for his time at $600 an hour.

THE killing of the joint resolution cutting twenty-five percent off the income tax for 1923 will occasion considerable extra bookkeeping for the Treasury Department and some inconvenience for the taxpayers. Neverthless the action was wise. The immediate reduction is one of the most popular features of the revenue law as passed in the House. It adds materially to the chance that the bill will go through the Senate and receive the President's signature. The proposal to strip it off from the bill and pass it separately looked too much like politics. With so much of a reduction assured, the irreconcilable Mellonites could safely have gone in for obstructionist tactics, and might perhaps have succeeded in putting over further revenue legislation until after the election, when it will be safer to ignore public opinion. This seems to be generally understood by the public—a proof that we are advancing in political sophistication.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

President Coolidge and Edward McLean

RECENTLY Senator Harrison of Mississippi criticized President Coolidge for continuing to consult and correspond intimately with a man like Edward McLean after the latter was more than suspected of having deliberately deceived a committee of the Senate about facts of great public importance. Later during the same session Senator Lodge accused Mr. Harrison of gross impropriety for his criticism of Mr. Coolidge's relation to Mr. McLean. "I think," he said, "it is little short of an outrage to bring the President's name into this matter as some have attempted to do today." "He is entitled to consideration in debate. It is important not to impair the faith of the people in high officials. Such a procedure lowers the character of the Senate in the opinion of the people." "The President should be lifted above rumor and the whisper of the corridor."

Many of the Democratic Senators replied to Mr. Lodge, but for the most part they confined themselves to insisting that President Coolidge was receiving a much fairer treatment at the hands of his political opponents than had the late Mr. Wilson. The retort was obvious and apt, but it ignored the merits of Mr. Lodge's contention. Is it an "outrage" to criticise a president for behaving as the record indicates Mr. Coolidge has behaved with respect to Mr. McLean?

Surely the sound answer to this question is a sharp and emphatic negative. On the contrary if the Democrats in and out of the Senate had not criticized the President for the dubious aspects of the relation between McLean and the White House and for the President's apparent lack of candor in explaining what the relationship was, they would have conspired with the Republicans to conceal from the American public information which it was entitled to possess. Criticism of even the highest public officers is justified in so far as it sheds some additional light upon the acts of government which the public is not likely to understand without interpretation.

Considered from this point of view the "attacks" of the Democratic senators, with the exception of Senator Heflin, have served a clear and a desirable public service. They have directed public attention to the dubious aspects of Mr. Coolidge's behavior. The Chairman of the Republican National Committee and its official organ of publicity have exhibited far more partisanship, intemperance and recklessness in denouncing Senator Walsh and Senator Wheeler than the Democrats have in criticizing President Coolidge.

The President's behavior, since the evidence of fraud in the oil leases was first produced, has not been above suspicion or above criticism. No fair-minded person suspects him, of course, of being directly implicated in the fraudulent transactions. No fair-minded person suspects him of a share in any conspiracy to conceal from the Senate Public Lands Committee information about the frauds which would contribute to the exposure and the conviction of directly guilty individuals. But he can be reasonably suspected of a relationship with at least one of the guilty individuals which was, under the circumstances, improper. Nor is this all. Since the evidence of that relationship came to the surface, he has done nothing or said nothing to clear up its more suspicious aspects. He is not behaving like a man who is anxious to reveal all the facts of the connection between Edward McLean and the White House. He is rather behaving as if there was something about that connection which it was advantageous for him to conceal.

Consider what the evidence of this connection is. Just about the time when the Senate investigation into the oil leases was getting warm and dangerous, the President's Private Secretary went to Florida for a vacation and during that vacation passed two weeks in daily conversation and consultation with Messrs. Fall and McLean. The account which Mr. Slemp gave of these meetings was not, to say the least, entirely convincing. According to his testimony Messrs. Fall, McLean and himself were merely a small group of intimate friends who were forgetting for a few days their share of responsibility for the government of the nation in the sunshine of a winter resort in Florida. Mr. Slemp did, indeed, incidentally advise his friend McLean to make a clean breast to the Senate Committee of the real facts about his relations with Fall, for Mr. Slemp apparently had some reason to suspect McLean's attempt at deceit.

But it is difficult to believe that Slemp in his own testimony behaved as candidly as he advised McLean to behave. During these weeks of golf and innocent conversation there was at least one occasion on which the President used McLean as a means of communication with his private secretary and when he called in McLean as a political adviser after McLean's exposure as a deliberate conspirator against the successful prosecution of an enterprise of great importance undertaken by another branch of the government.

In the meantime and thereafter McLean was pulling all his wires to prevent the investigation from being pushed any further in his direction and he was assisted in this effort by at least three members of the White House staff—a telegrapher, a door keeper and a secret service officer. One of Mr. McLean's representatives expected to accomplish somthing most advantageous for his chief by opening a wire direct to the White House. Another, Mr. Bennett, had an interview with the "principal" who assures him that there will be no resignations and no rocking of the boat. This

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

man in his testimony before the Senate Committee supplied an utterly incredible account of the meaning of this telegram. A few days later after the President had declared, on the anniversary of Lincoln's birthday, that he considered an accused man innocent until he is proved criminally guilty, Mr. McLean felicitated him on his public spirited attitude and elicited from the President a cordial and a friendly reply.

There are many facts in this record which demand explanation and which the President does not and apparently will not explain. They indicate the existence in Mr. Coolidge's personal staff of a number of employees who were solicitous to protect a man who had fallen back to lies in order to conceal from the government of the United States facts of immense public importance. They disclose an intimacy between the offender and the President's Private Secretary which indicate that the wire into the White House might have reached as far as the President's ante-room. Finally they indicate on Mr. Coolidge's part a callousness to McLean's published moral unreliability which is profoundly disquieting. If the President had shared the general indignation and repulsion which the exposures aroused, he could not have remained on such terms of friendly intimacy with one of the chief culprits.

In view of the undisputed facts of the relation between Mr. McLean and the White House and Mr. Coolidge's refusal to clear up the ambiguous facts, one inference seems forced upon both his friends and opponents. The connection which existed between Mr. McLean and the White House from March 4, 1921 until January, 1924, includes circumstances which, if divulged now, would have political consequences which would be damaging to the President and to the Republican party. The President is struggling to avoid the disclosure of these facts, and this struggle explains the equivocations, the hesitations and the furtiveness of his behavior with respect to some aspects of the oil scandals. It explains why he did not act promptly and decisively with respect to Denby and Daugherty. It explains why he has never publicly recognized the existence of any guilt with respect to the oil scandal except the kind of guilt which, if proved, would bring with it criminal prosecution. It explains why he has never aroused American public opinion by a vivid appeal for a vigorous and exhaustive investigation and the complete exposure of all the facts which explain how and why the fraudulent leases were signed. It explains why Senator Walsh has never received help in his inquiries from any of the intelligence bureaus in the executive departments. The President behaves as if he wished to conceal from the public information which, while it might not help the government prosecutors in convictinng Fall or Doheny, would help the American people to fix responsibility for a gross betrayal of their confidence.

He is receiving powerful backing in his attempt to prevent the American public from learning facts which would be damaging to his own candidacy and his party. The newspapers are singularly reticent. Of course they print reports of what the witnesses say and they describe the disclosures as "sensational," but they are far from making any sensational use of it. In their editorial comments they rarely analyze the doubtful testimony for the benefit of their readers and point out its discrepancies, its suspicious aspects and its obvious mystifications. They allow the public to make its own analysis, knowing full well how few readers of a daily paper possess the necessary time, patience and acumen to distinguish what is probably true from what is probably false in the evidence. The more conservative papers are occupied chiefly in accusing people who take the political aspects of the investigation seriously of "hysteria." They themselves, when they are not afflicted by this "hysteria," set an example to their fellow countrymen not merely of elevated calm but noble indifference. They are too superior to be suspicious. They are too public-spirited to be critical. They are too loyal to be inquisitive. In assuming this attitude they do not stand alone. They reflect perfectly the state of mind of those citizens both Democratic and Republican who consider Secretary Mellon to be the consummate American statesman and the election of President Coolidge, the man who stands behind Mr. Mellon, as indispensable to the welfare of the Republic.

The plain people of the United States should not have any illusions about the meaning of this attempt to limit the investigation and to confuse the demand for the disclosure of all pertinent information about the origin of the frauds with reckless and obscene scandal-mongering. The gentlemen who themselves are so nobly discreet and so patriotically unsuspicious and who accuse their more inquisitive fellow-countrymen of being hysterical are prompted chiefly by one object. They hope to prevent the revelation to the American voter of the information which he needs in order to reach a sound estimate of the amount of indirect responsibility for the oil scandals which attaches to the Harding administration and its accommodating attitude towards business. They hope to use the office of President as a sanctuary in which to conceal ugly facts which, if divulged, would throw too much light upon the ways and means of a Republican administration. If these people do what they wish, they will injure something far more necessary to the vitality of American government than the prestige of the presidential office. They will deprive public opinion of confidence in the sources from which its information is supposed to come. They will prevent public opinion from obtaining access to those facts which are necessary to passing a discriminating judgment on the conduct of its public officials. They will in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fact provoke the hysteria which they pretend to deprecate. A public opinion that is uninformed, mis-informed, uneasy and suspicious is almost certain to act intemperately, hastily and destructively. It is only a public which has reason to believe that it is not being deceived which can afford to be patient, tolerant, discriminating and composed.

Peace without Victory in the Coal Industry

ONLY a few months ago the outlook for peace in the bituminous coal industry was dark indeed. Well informed observers were generally predicting another strike in April. But contrary to all forecasts, the joint conference of operators and union closed a few weeks ago with an agreement which, barring a crisis, assures industrial peace in the unionized coal industry for the next three years. This settlement has consequences and a meaning which are important outside, as well as within, the coal industry.

Wages, according to the new contract, remain where they were. The fixing of wage rates for so long a period in a basic industry is a significant sign of the times. Less than three years have elapsed since the depression of 1921 and the vigorous, but in the main unsuccessful, attempts during it to liquidate wages and to establish a new and radically lower price level than then prevailed. These attempts were marked generally by failure. Leadership in the movement to resist them was more than once furnished by the United Mine Workers. Now a wage contract which has the effect of maintaining wage rates at their war level until the spring of 1927 is received with scant comment and certainly with little excitement. When the economic history of this period comes to be written, nothing should deserve more attention and closer analysis than the results of the wage policy of organized labor in the post-war period.

This contract was negotiated, moreover, in an industry in which there is a large and powerful group of non-union operators and where the union employers themselves have proved, in the past, their capacity for carrying on a long and stubborn fight. Yet agreement came easily and swiftly; the only radical change in the program of the union consisted in the reduction of the term of the contract from four to three years. If the reports of the newspapers may be trusted on this phase of the conference, the promptness with which the coal operators accepted the terms of the union was due to pressure from the federal administration. With the election of President Harding, it was generally believed in the country that the official attitude toward organized labor had changed and that justice would be meted out, as between employer and employee, with a stronger hand than was used during the Wilson administration. Early acts of Harding in fact confirmed this view. The trade unions, however, showed considerable vitality and a more tolerant, if not friendlier, attitude was forced upon the administration. That President Coolidge, with his Boston record behind him, should even indirectly connive at a settlement with the powerful union of miners is not alone an indication that nomination and election for the presidency are near. It is simply another evidence that the status of trade unions in this country has changed radically since 1914. There is now every sign that they have, in the past ten years, come to be regarded as permanent institutions, whose views and policies must be given prompt and effective consideration.

Within the soft coal industry the present settlement represents a complete change of front from the position which the operators adopted during the last great strike in the industry. At that time, both in private and public discussion, every conceivable effort was exerted to destroy the prevailing system of national collective bargaining, whereby arrangements in the central competitive fields became ruling throughout the industry. The costliness and unfairness of this system was then the subject of discussion in almost all organs of public opinion and the views of the operators won a friendly hearing in many quarters. Only the victory of the miners' union prevented the overthrow of this centralized system of collective bargaining, which, more than any other factor, is responsible for what little order the industry can show in its industrial relations. This year the central competitive field is restored to its position of importance, without excitement and with little public discussion. Something like national collective bargaining again rules in the bituminous industry.

The effects of this successful settlement will undoubtedly be to allow the major portion of the industry three years, free from costly disturbances, and to reinforce the prestige of the United Mine Workers. So far as these ends are achieved, the agreement should turn out to be a wise and useful one. It does not, however, except very indirectly, affect those enduring problems of the industry, which are now universally conceded to be fundamental to its peaceful and efficient conduct. The assumption that over-expansion, the utilization of excess capacity, and over-manning can be remedied by the maintenance of a high level of wage rates is not supported by the experience of the past. Control, to strike at such evils, must be direct and relevant. Aside from the fact that no one knows whether the present level of wages in the coal industry will be high or low one, two, or three years from now, it is the general experience in organized industries that wage policy has little influence in the long run in weeding out the inefficient and high cost enterprises. The soft coal industry will be operated at its appropriate and economical capa--

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

city only when it has become subject to an adequate machinery of control.

Given three years of peace, a fair volume of employment, and hence, substantial collections of dues and assessments through the check-off, the union will have large resources for continuing its struggle to organize the non-union fields. It is inevitable that West Virginia and the other non-union areas should become the scene of the great battles for control which will be waged in the next few years. How soon this happens, depends on the policy of Mr. Lewis and his cabinet and on the political complexion of the non-union territories. But it is certain that the organization of miners cannot long resist the pressure of union operators that they be freed from the costly competition of unorganized coal fields.

Oil and the A. P.

WHAT part the press should have played in reporting the story of oil is a much debated question. Mr. Vanderlip contends that there was a period of twenty-two months between the time the leases were signed and the ultimate crash, when the press lay back on its oars. The first leases date from April, 1922. In that month Senator La Follette publicly attacked them. The story was there. Why didn't the press go after it?

Here and there the press replies. Thus the New York World: "If he [Mr. Vanderlip] had taken the least trouble to look into the facts or even to read the facts, he would know that the Senate committee was searching the records and other sources of information, and that such sources of information as it was ready to disclose were published in the newspapers. It was not engaged merely in spreading scandalous rumors for scandal's sake."

But is that all? Weren't there occasions, meantime, when the press was spreading good cheer for scandal's sake? Leaving aside for the moment the question whether most papers did not fail for more than a year to report the most sensational news in Washington, when there were enough suspicious circumstances to justify at least a careful investigation, there remains one striking bit of evidence of the part played by the press—not given the attention it deserves. Not given that attention: because it takes a great organization like the Associated Press to scatter the news broadcast—and this affair concerns a slip on the part of the Associated Press itself.

Remember it was on December 12, 1922, that Mr. Doheny received the contract finally confirming his privilege to exploit the great Elk Hills reserve in California. At that time it was not known, to be sure, that Mr. Doheny had let Secretary Fall have $100,000 on an extraordinary non-interest-bearing loan. But it *was* known that the navy had lost its rights in its own oil field, by that contract of December 12. The terms of that lease were written, then, precisely in the form in which Congress was later to declare them "against the public interest." And did the Associated Press then sound a note of warning— or so much as hint that this might not be the best of all oil contracts? Its night wire from Washington, on December 14th, began as follows:

> WASHINGTON, December 14.—A huge fuel supply for the Pacific Fleet will be built up, an extensive tract of country developed and facilities for handling oil increased, and the Government will get immediate benefit of royalties from naval reserve No. 1 in California, as a result of the extension today of a contract between the Government and the Pan-American Petroleum & Transport Co., it was said after announcement of the change was made by Secretary Denby.

"Huge fuel supply for the Pacific Fleet"—"Government will get immediate benefit of royalties"—how does that read now?

The rest of the A. P. wire, as read into the Walsh committee investigations (page 1631) goes on in the same spirit for some eight hundred words. Mr. Doheny is quoted as to the benefits the government will derive. Secretary Denby comes in for a paragraph or two. Mr. Doheny returns to repeat himself on the benefits to the government. The whole message strikes an optimistic chord. What could have been the effect of breaking the news to the country in those terms, other than to contribute toward the calming of all doubts? And such doubts had arisen. For it was eight months earlier that Senator La Follette had attacked the first Doheny lease.

Presumably a report of this character went to all the papers which the A. P. serves. It is Senator Smoot who points out "of course that [the report] would go to about 1,300 or 1,400 papers."

The navy lost its oil. And the A. P. broadcasted a story of good cheer. The heading used by the Los Angeles Times summed its message fairly:

"OIL ASSURED FOR FLEET."

Good reading now!

The Problem of the Smith Candidacy

THE friends of Governor Smith are making out an exceedingly strong case for his right to the Democratic nomination for President. He is an honest man, and an able one. He has proved himself one of the best executives the State of New York has produced. His methods of political strategy are direct and open and commend themselves strongly to the average citizen. He has never failed, when the occasion arose, to take his stand on the side of a democratic and progressive liberalism, neither has he weighed political costs against his principles. For his virtues he has been

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rewarded by an immense popularity which is one of the most striking signs of the essential soundness of the American democracy. If he secured the nomination for the Presidency, he would carry New York, New Jersey and Illinois, and very likely Massachusetts. These states together with the Solid South would come within sixty votes of electing him, and the probability is strong that he could pick up those sixty votes, even if no third party is launched. If the Progressives of the Northwest launched a party of their own, it would draw enough votes away from the Republicans to make Smith's election certain.

Against such a case as this, what have the opponents of Governor Smith to urge? That he is a Roman Catholic. But for this fact the movement for his nomination would be irresistible. Now, how much weight is it reasonable to give to a candidate's religion, in a country where religious freedom is guaranteed in the Constitution? In theory, it should not be given any weight at all. If we had arrived at a state of universal political enlightenment and social adjustment, it would not be given any weight. Unhappily we have not yet arrived at such a state, and it behooves all Americans who place the national welfare above party advantage and personal ambition to consider seriously the remote as well as the immediate effects of the election of a Roman Catholic to the Presidency.

It is well known that in large sections of the country, and among considerable classes everywhere the anti-Catholic feeling generated in the Reformation period remains active and militant. Anti-Catholicism furnishes the chief capital of the Ku Klux Klan today. It accounts in large part for the old American anxiety over immigration from southern and eastern Europe. Immigration from Poland and Italy increases the proportion of Catholics in the population both actually and potentially—potentially because of the superior fecundity of those peoples.

Millions of Americans are seriously alarmed over what they term the Catholic menace. Other millions, equally averse to Catholicism, still maintain the optimistic view that nothing can alter the fundamentally Protestant character of the nation. The election of a Catholic to the Presidency would shake this latter class out of their complacency and make out of them a rich source of recruits to nativism and the Ku Klux.

In such an event the religious motive, which has hitherto played a subordinate part in our politics, would be certain to work its way into the foreground. Little by little the nativistic South would detach itself from its allegiance with the urban democracies of the East and align itself with the Nordic Northwest. Our political alignments would run in terms of Protestant against Catholic, native and Nordic against newer immigrant stocks, country against city. In so far as the economic question entered in at all, it would result in a union between the Protestant, native, country party and the capitalistic class of the cities. For both the Ku Klux and the capitalist shape their ideals on the past, a past of self help and unrestrained private enterprise. Neither views sympathetically the demand of the urban masses for conditions of living controlled by the community.

In mere numbers the two parties might be fairly evenly matched. The cities, however, are increasing in population more rapidly than the country, and in no distant future might easily dominate the House of Representatives. The country, thanks to our constitutional scheme, would continue to dominate the Senate. It is hard to escape the conclusion that in these circumstances our governmental machine would become almost incapable of operation.

The consequences of the election of Governor Smith to the Presidency would be extremely grave. They would be grave only because of the persistence of religious intolerance among us. Might it not be better, Governor Smith's friends are asking, to meet the issue squarely at once and by making Governor Smith President, prove that we are capable of living up to our pretensions of religious equality? Governor Smith could be counted on to prove that a Catholic can make an exceptionally capable chief executive of the nation.

We do not believe that tolerance can be established by fighting, at the polls or in the field of battle. It will come to us, if at all, through a gradual process of education. It is most likely to come when the communicants of all creeds and persons of no creed work together in a common cause. We are fast approaching the point where a real alignment can be established in politics. The democratic elements of city and country alike are beginning to recognize the need of union against predation and arbitrary capitalistic control of the resources of the nation. It is no time to drag in the religious issue. We think that Governor Smith sees this himself and will decide before the time of the convention that his candidacy is not conducive to the best interests of the American people, Protestant or Catholic, and should therefore be withdrawn.

THE NEW REPUBLIC

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1924, IN THE U. S., BY THE REPUBLIC PUBLISHING CO., INC., 421 WEST 21ST ST., NEW YORK.
HERBERT CROLY, PRES. ROBERT HALLOWELL, TREAS.
DANIEL MEBANE, CIRCULATION MANAGER.

EDITORS

HERBERT CROLY BRUCE BLIVEN ROBERT LITTELL
ALVIN JOHNSON R. M. LOVETT STARK YOUNG

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

JANE ADDAMS JOHN DEWEY R. H. TAWNEY
DAVID FRIDAY H. N. BRAILSFORD LEO WOLMAN

RATES: SINGLE COPIES, FIFTEEN CENTS; YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION, FIVE DOLLARS; CANADIAN, FIVE DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS; FOREIGN, SIX DOLLARS; THREE MONTHS' TRIAL, ONE DOLLAR.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Are the Republicans a Party?

IT is so easy to perceive decay in an old political party that the very fact causes doubt of the value of the evidence. Yet, it is impossible for one to observe at close hand the conduct of the Republican party in the tax fight in the House, following the record of the party for years past, without seriously asking whether that party is not disintegrating—not merely with respect to its immediate problems, but permanently; not merely as it is being killed in this Congress by the La Follette balance of power, but permanently as the virile, affirmative organization which governed the country for half a century.

The responsible leadership of the party committed itself as definitely as leadership could be committed to one major policy in this session, the Mellon tax plan. In that committal it had behind it the great opinion-creating and opinion-producing agencies of the country east of the Mississippi River, the newspapers, the magazines, the various kinds of associations of business people. And perhaps never in the history of the country has a policy projected under such auspices and with such support suffered such complete collapse. It virtually collapsed on the first day that organized opposition was breathed.

Mr. Longworth, the party leader in the House, whose long service gives him an intuitive sense of the practicable, surrendered when the first gun was fired by the Democrats. For days he sought compromise with the Democrats, using to the full his personal intimacy with Mr. Garner, leader of the Democrats in tax legislation. When that undertaking failed, Mr. Green, Republican chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, sought compromise with the La Follette group. That undertaking failed because the Mellonites would not accept the compromise terms suggested by the La Follette group. The Republican majority of the committee, mostly a carefully selected group of extreme conservatives, then brought out the Mellon income rates. Mr. Longworth immediately sought compromise again, anyway, anyhow.

His efforts continued for days. When the House was dealing with the bill in committee of the whole, the efforts were so futile that no compromise was offered, and in the voting on income rates choice was left between the Democratic and the Frear-La Follette plans. Later, when the bill was on final passage, a last-hour compromise was effected upon an income tax schedule, labelled "Republican" but differing from the Democratic plan only in detail. It permitted the insurgents to boast that they had forced reversal of the principle of the Mellon plan. The boast was justified by Mr. Mills of New York and other Mellon advocates. And Mr. Treadway of Massachusetts was so outraged that he cried out in anger on the floor against dictation by the insurgent minority of Republicans to the regular majority.

In this process of yielding inch by inch to prevail upon the insurgents to vote for a bill labelled "Republican," although its content as to income taxes was virtually Democratic, and it still carried the fifty percent increase in estate taxes, the gift tax and the provision for Congressional access to income tax returns, all gravely objectionable to the administration, the Republican managers in the House paid no attention to the Mellon rates. In committee of the whole, the Mellon program was brought up only when Mr. Madden, Old Guard stalwart, took it upon himself to force a vote, and the vote demonstrated the wisdom of Mr. Longworth's politics. Mr. Madden shouted to the Republicans that the Mellon rates were the Republican ticket. Approximately one third of the Republicans ignored his shout. The same thing happened when the same effort and the same battle-cry were put forth in the final balloting.

Now, the important fact to note is that Mr. Madden was right in his shout to the Republican side. The Mellon plan was the Republican ticket. It had been made the Republican ticket not alone by the administration's insistent demand, but by the endorsement of those elements which constitute the foundation strength of the regular Republican organization. And when it is clearly understood that the Mellon plan was the Republican ticket, the real significance of one third of the members of the Republican party in the House refusing to vote for it begins to emerge. The plan—the party ticket—was bolted not alone by the La Follette balance of power group; it was bolted by a large group of other insurgents.

The next fact to be noted is that this débâcle of party effort is not out of line with the record of the Republican party. It is in line. It is sixteen years since the Republican party was a reliable agency for affirmative action, and sixteen years is a long period in which to test a party. From the hour of Taft's election in 1908, the Republican party has been unstable in the discharge of affirmative responsibilities. Mr. Taft's administration was marked by dissension, disunion and debility. From the time of Wilson's election in 1912 until 1918 the Republican party had no affirmative policies. Much of the time a great part of it was reluctantly following Wilson in legislation. From 1918 until the incoming of Harding, it was wholly negative. And even the overwhelming majority in Congress in the first half of the Harding administration did not prevent doubts, indecisions and reversals of policies.

So, the record flows naturally into the Mellon

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tax plan disaster—flows steadily whether the well-trained conservative statesman Taft was at the party helm, or the well-trained conservative politician Harding was at the helm, or the well-trained conservative politician-statesman Coolidge was there, or whether the helm was in charge of a group of political first mates as during the Wilson administration. Moreover, this is to be marked: the paralyzing ruptures of the past were caused by exactly the same facts as the paralysis in the Mellon fight, that is, the insistence of the men in control of party direction upon given policies and the bitter rebellion of men from the West. That caused the breakdown of the Taft administration; it caused the bolt of 1912; it caused the defections to Wilson between 1912 and 1918; it caused the amazing weakness of the Harding administration in Congress in 1921 and 1922.

Obviously, there underlies such divisions continued over a long period a deepseated antagonism on fundamentals. It cannot be accounted for by ordinary factional differences, or, as the regulars contended in 1912, by personal ambition. It is an antagonism growing out of opposing economic interests, and coloring social views. That was true between 1908 and 1912 and it is true now, no matter what particular aspects the conflict may assume. No better illustration of this can be had than a brief and unimportant exchange between Mr. Mills, of New York, and Mr. Green, of Iowa, in the debate over the gift tax while the tax bill was in the House.

Mr. Green wanted to enact a gift tax because he believed it would increase revenues under the surtaxes and the estates taxes by serving as a barrier to evasions. Mr. Mills, an opponent of high surtaxes and of increased estate taxes, fought the gift tax. The West wanted to tax the rich to relieve the poor. The East wanted to relieve the rich, and argued such relief to be best for the country. So much for the opposed economic views. As to the social consequence of these opposed views: Mr. Mills, in the manner of one putting a poser, inquired whether Mr. Green would tax the gift of a $10,000 necklace given by a man to his wife at Christmas. And Mr. Green almost jubilantly replied that it would be most desirable so to tax ostentation. Mr. Green is not a La Follette man; he had been counted a regular until the tax fight opened.

There is every reason to believe that the antagonism will become stronger, not weaker, in the future. The powerful conservatives of the East see no protection for their interests and their convictions save in the Republican party. They cannot turn to the Democratic party, since, whatever its deficiencies, it leans toward progressivism, not alone because of the direction given it in the Wilson administration, but because its popular strength is among the small farmers of the South and the wage-earners of the North. Hence, the Eastern conservatives must at any cost retain their grip on the Republican organization, unless they are willing to relinquish political control, which they are far from considering. And this grip is bound to be opposed by the West with increasing vigor and increasing strength, because the West is steadily formulating a semi-radical social theory in addition to its semi-radical economic interest. It is developing an educated semi-radicalism.

It is to be gravely doubted that such a struggle can go on indefinitely without tearing the Republican party wide open, and destroying it as the piece of political mechanism the country has used most of the time since the Civil War. A party cannot suffer such futility as it has shown in the tax fight without paying a severe penalty. The danger to the party organization goes farther than the effects of internecine strife. It goes to the very roots of popular confidence in it. Ours is a party government. Good or bad, conservative or radical, a party must have formulated and accepted ideas and purposes—as the Republican party had for many years—else it becomes insufficient as an instrument in the hands of the country. Clearly, the Republican party has none, and has no prospects of evolving any.

To make the danger to the Republican party on that score more pronounced, there is the fact that the Democratic party presented an exactly opposite picture in the tax fight. I do not discuss here the merits of the Democratic position on taxes. I merely point to the fact that, as a party, it was able to formulate a definite policy, based upon an economic and social theory that certainly is arguable, and then was able to sustain its policy by a united front. In other words, it was a political party in fact, not merely in name. More, the little group of radicals in the House was able to do precisely the same thing. After all the pulling and hauling in the name of Republicanism that the regulars were able to do, there remained the La Follette bloc, actually swinging the balance of power, and, in sum, presenting a picture of party action far beyond the powers of the Republicans. Both Democrats and La Follette radicals proved themselves political agencies with the power to act, without which no political agency is worth its salt, and the Republicans proved themselves an agency without power to act—except on terms dictated to them.

It is useless to attempt specific predictions. Chance plays a mighty part in politics, and chance may save the Republican party for some years. But it is almost impossible to believe that the process of decay which has been so apparent since Roosevelt yielded the presidency to Taft will not finally result in the disappearance of the Republican party as we have known it. The period may be one of years. The final sum of it all may still be called Republicanism. But the old party, registering one failure after another until it reaches

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a pitiable fiasco in a major tax policy with which it sought to control the very bottom political sentiment of the country, without doubt cannot survive indefinitely.

And assuredly its peril is increased in this year by the availability of La Follette as the leader of a bolt of the rebellious element, long held in subjection. Chance may play against it as well as for it. Chance may have given the rebellious in this year a logical leader for their logical departure from the old standard. And the tax fight may stimulate La Follette no less than the opportunism thrown into the general situation by the oil scandal. It is incredible that such a collapse of the Republican program could have occurred in the tax fight in the House unless there were a profound popular protest in the West against the Mellon plan so strenuously urged by the men in control of the party machinery, and an equally profound distrust of the men who control the organization of the Republican party.

JOHN W. OWENS.

Radio Politics

IN 1924 for the first time in the history of these United States a presidential candidate will have the chance to be judged out of his own mouth by any large proportion of the electorate. For by radio that campaign will notably be waged. Indeed in the optimistic opinion of Mr. Owen D. Young, chairman of the boards of directors of the General Electric Company and the Radio Corporation of America, "no citizen of this great country need say that he has not heard the pronouncements of the presidential candidates of the two great national parties. . . . What a great hope for democracy!"

Already democracy, within Mr. Young's bipartisan limitation, is making the most of its opportunity. Broadcasting apparatus has been set up on the White House lawn, and it has been announced that President Coolidge will use it extensively in his campaign. William G. McAdoo has applied for a permit to erect a broadcasting station at his Los Angeles home. The new political weapon, which was brandished in the British campaign last December, is sure to be wielded spectacularly in our own. Can it, as Mr. Young believes, prick into quicker, more coherent action our unwieldy democratic giant? Or with its shining novelty will its seeming power too be gone? What are the inherent political potentialities of the radio? Aside from the immense publicity value which its present newness gives it what can it actually effect in a presidential election which the newspaper or the motion picture cannot? Assuming, as we seem to have good reason to assume, that the hats of the candidates will be in the radio ring, what will it profit us or them? What new bases of judgment can the radio actually make available to the voter?

Four barriers between the voter and the candidate it does apparently to a unique degree overcome: the barriers of distance, of time, of inertia, and of crowd psychology.

Primarily of course it clears the geographical barrier more neatly and nimbly than either of its chief predecessors, the newspaper and the motion picture. It does bring to the physically remote voter a type of first-hand information he has never had before. For it not only transmits to him the candidate's complete and exact words, which the newspaper too can do, and sometimes does, but it gives them in his own voice, with his own revealing emphasis, with his own chuckle, or candor, or unction, with the immediate warm reaction of his personality, down to the very creaking of his shirt studs. The vivid possibilities of such radio impressions were illustrated to me the other day in talking with a farmer's wife in a remote backwater. Until last summer, despite the automobile, she had never been a hundred miles from home. Now she greeted me eagerly across her ironing board. "You must come in," said she, "and hear John's radio. The Atlanta man's talking now. You can't mistake *him*. It takes him ten minutes to get out a sentence. Not so palavering as the Newark man though. Why, when they have a special feature he just drips like a maple tree in the spring. . . . Yes, we heard Mr. Lloyd George. Quite a joker, isn't he?"

Potentially the radio gives every member of the electorate the possibility of a direct reaction to the candidates themselves. It does reproduce to some degree, for the first time in the United States, the conditions of the Athenian democracy where every voter, for himself, could hear and judge the candidates. It puts personal campaigning on a scale more nearly commensurate with the nation. It makes available to the voter, so to speak, source material.

The chief and indisputable impressiveness of the radio as against the newspaper and the motion picture both as a newsbringer and as a conveyer of personality is in the instantaneousness of its transmission. Comparatively the motion picture is an historical record, and so for that matter is the newspaper. Two advantages this would seem to give the radio as an aid to the voter's independent individual judgment of the candidate. The listener can form his own opinion from the candidate's utterance, before the press or the parties

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

can instruct him; and because this speech is news, likely at any moment to have an interesting denouement, he will listen even after the novelty of the medium no longer attracts him.

And beyond the mere multiplication of a man's audience,—the tremendous increase in the number of persons put in instantaneous contact with his personality,—the radio provides two other factors conducive to independent individual judgment which even the Athenian candidate within easy reach of his public did not possess. It is possible to reach the lazy, the illiterate, and the prejudiced, the mentally as well as the geographically remote. For in radio your audience does not have to come to you. You go to your audience. Your listener as a rule need make no physical effort to hear you, and he can do so in private without compromising or committing himself in the eyes of his fellow citizens. (When it is actually easier to listen in than to read, and often more exciting, who can tell to what calamitous political excesses it may one day lead? See grandmother being converted to Socialism as she knits of an evening with her earphones on. See uncle John "falling for" the single tax.)

The other distinctive contribution of the radio lies in the unique position of the auditors themselves, the position of being of an audience yet each alone in it, apart from its collective whimsies, transports and rages. For though one addresses a million people at once he can count on no group response, for his voice reaches them not as a mass but as isolated units. They do not, they cannot react upon him or each other. He cannot sense their feeling. He cannot adapt himself to them. There is no mutuality, no emotional give and take between speaker and audience. They cannot heighten or lower his mood. On the other hand he cannot sway the mob from his convenient rostrum because there is no mob to sway. The listeners do not have to declare themselves. In an atmosphere untroubled by group contagion they hear him each practically alone. It is his sheer personality against each of theirs.

Assuming that this new campaign instrument is a more immediate conveyer of message and personality to both the geographically and the mentally remote than any other medium, and that its use avoids the aberrant factor of mob psychology, just how effective in this election is it genuinely likely to be?

Any appreciable effect postulates a tremendous number of listeners. Ears aplenty equipped to hear we know that there are. At a recent reckoning there were thought to be 2,800,000 receiving sets in use in this country, and until lately manufacturers could turn out neither sets nor parts sufficiently fast to meet the demand. We know too if we may trust the reports that those sets were almost universally used to hear President Coolidge's message to Congress, to hear Mr. Wilson, to hear Mr. Lloyd George. With the present zest for listening for listening's sake, and with the present range in programs from various assortments of jazz to weather reports and speeches by unknown persons on such subjects as the History of Public Accountancy it would seem as if a presidential candidate might continue this summer to have an equal chance. But how long and patiently will people listen? To be sure presidential candidates have in the past been practically the only speakers in the United States who were invariably sure of an audience, but how much of that audience was due to interest in the speech and how much was party demonstration?

If the lack of sociability militates against the radio's continued political audience, other characteristic attributes would seem to further it,—the effortlessness of listening, the news value of the speech, and the fact that for most of us the radio is a chief channel through which we may judge for ourselves the personality of a candidate. Thousands of people voted for Mr. Harding basically because they liked his photographed face. Thousands of people are going to vote for or against Mr. Coolidge on account of his voice. While Mr. Harding was known to most of us as a photograph, already to many, even to those who have never heard him, Mr. Coolidge is distinctly known as a voice, a nasal New England voice.

It must be admitted that the radio lacks one of the most valuable qualities of the newspaper and of the motion picture. Where they function as both transmitters of news and as records of it, the radio is merely a transmitter, and a transmitter of it in a less easily remembered form. Because of our bookish schooling or from the evanescent nature of the medium itself most of us do not follow an argument heard so accurately as a printed one. We are dependent on visual notes for exactness of memory. The auditory impression of a political speech may be so vague that the principal effect will be one's new concept of the speaker himself—unless having heard, we demand that the newspapers begin to take more exact notes for us and print the speech verbatim. The radio's chief function may be that of publicity agent—an effective means of calling attention to the candidate's utterance, as afterward printed.

The increase of emphasis on personality through the use of the radio might prove of general political import in improving the chances of the independent candidate if the radio were open to him. When a good radio presence, so to speak, might eclipse even the hearty handshake as a vote getter, it might indeed be worth the independent's while to spend his hundred dollars each evening for ten minutes on the air. Think what migh happen if wandering voices were suddenly loosed into the night, if anybody without benefit of party might catch the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

voter's ear. What might not your independent with a clear enunciation and a sympathetic personality accomplish,—some Daniel Webster of the radio? Suppose for instance that Theodore Roosevelt had had access to a broadcasting station in 1912!

It remains a question how long the political use of the radio will be merely as transmitter of the direct campaign utterances of candidates. When the battle is definitely transferred to the air, may we not expect all the familiar features of the usual campaign reproduced there? Shall we not have our Republican and our Democratic broadcasting stations? Will not interfering wave lengths take the place of rotten eggs? Will not the voice of the radio agent fill the air as the typewriter of his brother the press agent fills the newspapers? We may then expect bedtime stories burbling with anecdotes of some candidate's boyhood, tenors expanding on his favorite lullaby, radio orchestras playing his special march directly after the Star Spangled Banner, even the voice of his aged mother now and then quavering out a tribute.

Against such propaganda, against censorship, conscious and unconscious, the radio can give the voter but one safeguard in that it can, if it will, more freely than the newspaper expose him to the several local varieties. Your remote Main Streeter could not procure, even if he would read, current newspapers from Omaha, Los Angeles, El Paso and Providence: he has been practically forced to take his news solely through the strainer of his local press. News with bias the radio may still give him but it will not be merely the bias of his particular geographical or his particular spiritual section. Literally he cannot help hearing all sides.

The radio has furnished us a conversational meeting ground. But it has not yet allowed us to any extent to converse. Unlike the telephone, and to some degree even the newspaper, it is not yet a medium for exchange of opinion. How far it can directly accelerate political progress until there is more mutuality, more free interchange, until more of the groups of radio listeners have also transmitting facilities, until it can be used by groups as a medium of mutual adjustment, as the telephone is used today by individuals, is still in doubt.

Can a voice crying in the wilderness manage to bring together widely scattered and inarticulate individuals into new political alignments? In this election we have a first test case for our social psychologists to analyze. Here as in no former political situation we have the opportunity for an instantaneous national fixation of interest, the feeling of all sitting in together at the same national forum. It will be interesting to see whether it is true, as the telephone company has so long assured us, that the voice with the smile wins.

EUNICE FULLER BARNARD.

The Treasury and Interest Rates

AN editorial writer recently cast Secretary Mellon in the rôle of schoolmaster. Congressmen were the recalcitrant pupils,—boisterous and stubborn and bumptious. Taxation was the subject in hand. The method was that of the correspondence school. Those lessons have drawn to a close. But the pupils have new queries. They wish to know now why the Secretary of the Treasury is paying interest rates of four to four and three-quarters percent for short-time government loans. Shipstead and Couzens have raised this question. They want to know why the government should be paying four and one quarter percent now, when it used to borrow money in prewar days at three percent. It seems to them that this rate of interest is needlessly high. It increases the interest payments of the federal treasury and so is a burden upon the nation's finances. They insist also that the high rate of interest paid on government securities sets the pace in maintaining a high interest rate on borrowings of all kinds.

The Secretary has given the conventional answer of economic theory. The rate of interest is a price, and as such, is fixed by the forces of supply and demand which operate in the money market. It is sound fiscal policy to issue treasury certificates of indebtedness at a rate which will make them sell at par. Certificates outstanding bearing four to four and one fourth percent were selling approximately at par. Therefore it was impossible to reduce the rate of interest to three and one half percent without forcing the price below face value.

All this would be quite conclusive if it were not for the unusual technical position of the twelve Federal Reserve banks. These banks may buy and hold government securities as part of their assets. Their resources are divided into two broad classes: reserves, consisting of upwards of $3,000,000,000 of gold which earns them nothing, and earning assets. These latter amounted, on February 20, the last date for which figures are available, to $950,000,000. These earning assets are today at almost the lowest point reached since the war. At the height of credit expansion in 1920 they amounted to more than $3,000,000,000. They are, therefore, at an abnormally low level.

These earning assets consist of three items:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bills discounted for member banks, acceptances which the Federal Reserve banks have bought in the open market, and government securities purchased and owned by the Federal Reserve banks. It is this last item which is of special interest and importance for the Secretary of the Treasury in determining the rate at which he can float Treasury certificates of indebtedness. At the present time the twelve banks hold only $155,000,000 of government obligations. In May, 1922, they held over $600,000,000. They had acquired them because the member banks had reduced their borrowings from three billion dollars in 1920 to half a billion in 1922, so that the twelve Federal Reserve banks considered it desirable to acquire government securities in order to prevent their earning assets from declining to a point where the banks would fail to earn their operating expenses.

Even a year ago the Reserve banks had $363,000,000 of government securities on hand, as against the $155,000,000 which they hold now. They have reduced their earnings by more than $200,000,000, and these have not been replaced by other assets. They parted with these holdings very largely to enable the Secretary of the Treasury to test the market rate which was necessary to keep the certificates at par without support from the Reserve banks. Then, too, a year ago there was widespread fear of a period of inflation. This, had it occurred, would have sent the member banks to the Reserve banks for large borrowings and would have offset the decline in government securities with bills discounted for members. But the expected inflation failed to materialize, so that bills discounted for members are now sixty millions less than they were a year ago. The Reserve banks have made up for most but not all of this decline by their purchases of acceptances in the open market. But their holdings of government securities are $200,000,000 lower.

It is perfectly clear, therefore, that the Federal Reserve banks could absorb without any difficulty $200,000,000 to $300,000,000 of the Treasury obligations which must be issued on March 15. It would not bring their earning assets above the level of a year ago, despite the fact that their holdings of reserves are larger than they were then. The amount which would be thus absorbed would be fully one half the issue which the Treasury must put out in order to meet its obligations.

What bearing has all this on the question of interest rates? During the last year the Reserve banks have been absent from the market as purchasers of government bonds and certificates, and they have to that extent lessened the demand. If they now return to the market, the demand at lower rates will be sharpened to a material degree. There are doubtless persons and institutions who would buy Treasury certificates of indebtedness yielding three and one half percent and pay par for them. But there are probably not enough of these to take the entire issue which must be sold on March 15. But the chances are that there are enough of them to take more than half that issue. The other half can be absorbed by the Federal Reserve banks if necessary.

For these banks find themselves upon a different footing from the ordinary investor. They are not operated for profit. They may not go into the market and buy railroad and other bonds, but are rather narrowly delimited in the sort of securities which they may acquire. They need give little consideration to the rate yielded by other bonds which they might buy. They are only obligated to pursue a policy which is in the public interest. If it is to the public interest to help the Secretary of the Treasury float securities at three and one half percent they may do so. There can, therefore, be no question that the issue of March 15 can be sold at a materially reduced rate of interest.

This could be continued in June, and probably throughout the year. If interest rates tend downward, as it seems probable now that they will, such a course of action on the part of the Reserve banks would doubtless accelerate the decline. It would certainly give the government an advantage by enabling it to anticipate the downward course of money rates.

Such a policy on the part of the Reserve banks would not be without cost to them, nor without some slight cost to the government because of a reduced franchise tax paid by the Reserve banks. Their purchase of government obligations on March 15 would bring about a reduction in the rediscounts of their member banks approaching in amount their acquisition of government securities. There would doubtless be a lag of some weeks in this process. The member banks are now paying the Reserve banks four and a half percent on these rediscounts. After purchasing the Treasury certificates the Reserve banks would be getting only three and one half percent. They would, therefore, lose one percent on all the rediscounts which are repaid because of their purchase of Treasury certificates. But the government saves an amount equal to the rate reduction on the entire issue.

The Reserve banks can, unquestionably, lower the rate which the government must pay for its funds. But will this action lower the interest rate for the commercial borrower? Will it, as Senator Shipstead insists, set the pace on borrowings of all kinds? It will undoubtedly have some effect in this direction. For in the last analysis the policy of the Reserve banks outlined above would be tantamount to a reduction in the rediscount rate.

At first blush it may seem preposterous to accomplish a reduction in the rediscount rate by such indirection as the purchase of Treasury certificates at a lower rate. But the rediscount situation has been influenced by varying the holdings of Treasury certificates before, and Secretary

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mellon was a party to the act. When the federal banks reduced their holdings of government securities by $350,000,000 during 1923, they were accomplishing much the same effect which would have been produced had the Federal Reserve Board raised the rediscount rate in the spring of 1923. This is a technical point which the general public does not comprehend and which is as yet beyond the grasp of many commercial bankers. But it is, nevertheless, the fact.

Since Secretary Mellon and the officials of the Federal Reserve system have experimented with tightening the money market for twelve months by reducing the holdings of government obligations on the part of Reserve banks, they might well reverse the process by increasing them a like amount during the next twelve months. All of us, Federal Reserve officials not excepted, have learned something by the experiment of the past year. We would undoubtedly increase our knowledge further by reversing the process during the next year. In all likelihood the senator from Minnesota would have the correctness of his position demonstrated as a result of the experiment. In any event it would save the government some money.

DAVID FRIDAY.

"Bello Bello"

THE word "beautiful" comes rarely to English lips. It is too long, too serious, a little foreign-sounding for our native taste. Uttering those three syllables we seem to be committing ourselves too irrevocably to a serious opinion; and we are chary of that, much too chary. "Beautiful"—it sounds high-brow, it suggests long hair; we are almost ashamed of saying it. It is only on solemn and rather tremendous occasions—on Sundays, so to speak, and not on common days—that an Englishman permits himself to pronounce so dangerous a word. Our ancestors' safer and more English monosyllable, "fair," has sadly come down in the world. The only beautiful thing that we still call fair is the weather. For the rest, it is now all but a term of denigration; it damns with faint praise. Restore to "fair" its original meaning, and Englishmen would no longer be chary of calling beauty by its name. It is only the formidable high-brow word, with its philosophical associations, that we are afraid of. Today the national epithet of approbation is "nice"—shrilling up in more emotional moments to "lovely." The fair maid of Perth is now a lovely Scotch girl, and many men so beautiful, a nice-looking lot.

More fortunate in this respect than we are, the Italians, when they talk of beauty, suffer from no inhibitions. Their word for "beautiful" is ancient and thoroughly native. "Bello" is as little high-brow as was our "fair." It suggests nothing philosophical or religious. The ghosts of Good and True march dimly behind our Beautiful. But bello is a peasant's word of which nobody need be ashamed, even if it does also happen to be Dante's word. Bello—it is the favorite national adjective; no word is oftener uttered. Bello bello—they love to double it, to put both barrels, bang! bang! left and right, into the same bird. Bello bello and then bellissimo, the coup de grâce with the butt-end while the bird is still struggling on the ground.

Bello, bellissimo, bellezza: the words beset Italian conversation. From a cornice by Michelangelo to a bel paese cheese or the most horrible dribbling baby, everything is beautiful. Is it in England that a political party would select as its battle-cry, "Youth, youth, spring-time of beauty?" But the Fascisti marched on Rome—or mostly, rather, went by train—to the tune of "Giovinezza, giovinezza, primavera di belle-e-e-ez-za!" And it would certainly have been difficult to find a set of young men less high-brow than the Fascists, less long-haired—spiritually long-haired, I mean; for physically long-haired the Black Shirts mostly were at that time, though the fashion has changed since then, with frizzy locks rising, perpendicular and stiff, six or seven inches into the air, for the sake, it was said, of looking piu terribili. Not since Trafalgar has beauty figured in an English patriotic song, and even here the third person in the trinity, "England, Home and Beauty," seems to have got there more by accident, and because England expected every man to do his duty, than by deliberate design. The exigencies of rhyme are forever incongruously coupling the Lady Beauty with the stern Daughter of the Voice of God. But in Italian, where every word rhymes with almost every other, the poet's hand is rarely forced, and if the Fascists sing of beauty when they march, it is because they like to, not because there are no other rhymes to youth.

Since bello, then, is the favorite Italian adjective, it would be natural to suppose that beauty was a quality in their surroundings to which the Italians attached great value. That they did so is sufficiently obvious; but that they do now is not, alas! quite so clear. Signor Ugo Ojetti, indeed, has roundly declared that the Italians today have, as a people, the worst taste of any in Europe. And certainly, when one looks at the modern villini on the outskirts of Italian towns, when one sees the furniture, the fabrics, the pictures and statuary they contain, one can believe that Signor Ojetti may perhaps be right.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For if bello is the Italian's favorite adjective, there is another that runs it very close in popularity: moderno. The Italians only ecstatically say bello; but moderno they really mean. And it appears to be impossible for a thing to possess both these qualities, in Italy at any rate, at the same time. Italy, the brand-new country that has only existed since 1870, is still too busy developing her material resources to be practically concerned with the reconciliation of bello (as the old Italians understood bello) with moderno. There are still too many waterfalls to be harnessed, too many power-stations and factories to be built, for the Italians to do much but talk about the bello. The people with the oldest and most splendid civilization in Europe are now in some ways younger than the Americans of a generation ago. They have grown into a kind of second boyhood when nothing matters but engines and motor cars. The vitality, intelligence, and energy of which in the past so much went into the creation of those works of art which, with the hotels, now constitute the necessary plant of the tourist industry, are still there; but they seem to have been deflected into other channels. But perhaps when the country has been made sufficiently moderno, its people will find the leisure to think of a new bellezza.

It is interesting, meanwhile, to see what does pass for artistically beautiful among the modernities. Signor Ojetti has complained that Italian bad taste is worse than the bad taste of other countries because it is less consistent and systematic. It is a bad taste of shreds and patches. But it seems to me that all contemporary manifestations of the bello in Italy, however different the conventions in terms of which they are executed, have always one thing in common: they are all fundamentally baroque. The model may be Bernini or Mestrovic, the convention may be one of extreme realism or geometrical simplification; it does not matter. In every work one sees that same baroque violence which defeats its own object, the emotionalism which does not move, the straining after effect which achieves nothing, the gesticulating sublime which is ridiculous. Bello in the twentieth century is a throaty music, is pages of d'Annunzio's clotted and feverish verbiage. Bello-cum-moderno manifests itself in the Victor Emanuel monument in Rome (not half bad, after all, if you leave the statues out, in the theatrical seventeenth-century manner); in the Centro della Città in Florence; in projects for war memorials conceived in the most powerful Munich style. By some strange and malignant fate the Italians, whose bello was once so sober and intellectual in its moving passion, seem to have got permanently bogged among the facile emotionalisms and violences of the seventeenth century. Palestrina was once a representative Italian artist; today it is Puccini.

There is no reason to suppose that the Italian character has fundamentally changed in recent centuries. The qualities which, in baroque art, reveal themselves as violence and emotionalism, were always there, but kept down, but tempered and severely moulded by the intellect. The most moving works of art are always those in which passion is confined within a severe formal scheme. The artists of the seventeenth century hoped, by throwing off formal restraint, by exploiting technical resources to their utmost limit, to make their works more moving and passionate. They achieved the exact opposite; and, compared with the works of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, theirs are uninteresting and even, positively, unexciting. The bello of today, being still further from the great tradition, is still less interesting.

Why the great tradition, the remains of which persisted, after all, till the end of the eighteenth century, should so miserably have perished in Italy, even as it did in our comparatively benighted England, is a great mystery. Mysterious, too, is the modern Italian tendency to prefer the worst foreign conventions to their own best. The Italian craftsman has all the skill he ever possessed; but if you ask a house-painter to decorate your house for you, his first instinct will be to cover your walls with all the horrible decorative shapes invented in Munich or Vienna during the last five-and-twenty years. But in this the Italian is not unique. The Chinese, it is said, are now ashamed of their ancient art, and prefer a colored supplement by Mr. Barribal to the finest work of painters ignorant of chiaroscuro and the laws of perspective. That we needs must love the highest when we see it is not, alas! invariably true. When a great tradition fails and grows tired through lack of great men to continue and develop it, when there are only second-rate artists repeating competently what has been done before, then a new and strikingly bad style—the important thing is that it should be striking—will come as a revelation, and we rush, in a delirious Gadarene descent, headlong towards the lowest. It is unlikely that Art Nouveau would have had much success in Rome during the lifetimes of Raphael and Michelangelo. And, conversely, bello-moderno will begin to mean something different from baroque emotionalism as soon as a few more artists of genius make their appearance upon the Italian scene.

ALDOUS HUXLEY.

Poems

When poems ripen into form,
Let them be harvested by a storm;
Let a great gale blow them down.
You will not find them late or soon
In orchards where such fruit should be,
But globes of amber out of the sea
Flung by the spinning black typhoon:
Apples of uncertainty,
An island pomegranate laced with brown,
A nectarine like a cloven moon.

GRACE HAZARD CONKLING.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Sargent Exhibition

EVERYBODY has known for years now what have been the characteristics of Sargent's painting. The energy and fruitfulness of his great gifts have sent his work in every direction. So that there can easily be said of the extensive exhibition that the Painters and Sculptors Gallery presents at the Grand Central the usual things. Sargent, to a degree that no one else has attained, has caught the restless quality of modern life, you see it in the postures of his sitters and especially in their eyes and mouths—though I must add that, in this event, modern life must mean Sargent's own generation; to my mind his people have very little of the quality of these later years. Sargent's brushwork, too, shines and glitters from his canvasses; there is something amazing in the ease and plenty and swing of his brush. It is his brush mainly that gives whatever style there is to his pictures, the animation and dexterity and cool power of Sargent's brush as he arrives at his picture.

As I walk through those rooms of Sargent's paintings at the Grand Central I feel this brush as a form of power and as a kind of wit too. I feel the vivacity of his people and of the portraits of them, though it appears to be a vivacity strangely without center, winking, like that wine of Keats', at the brim; these people slide out of their canvasses toward me—the composition for that matter does not hold most of them very tightly into the frame—and sometimes their eyes arrest me; and yet I feel that they have little to say that I want to hear. I realize more than ever as I look at them that Sargent could not be called a great draughtsman. He draws in the Javanese girl an extraordinary rhythm and final rest upon the feet. In the Lord Ribblesdale of the National Gallery he draws with great aristocracy and finality of line; the drawing in the Carmencita lifts and spins. But that Sargent does not on the whole draw with distinction is an old observation among his critics. And he has not great design. There is not very often in his composition that quality of line that quiets the intrusive period or generation in which the painting happened, and that establishes on the canvas a lasting abstraction of moving pattern or pure visual poetry free of the thing painted. In his color there is flow and ease, striking nuance and dexterity, and sometimes glare. But Sargent's color, as has been said often enough, and as anyone ought to see after five minutes at the Grand Central, has no great depth; his color lacks profundity and passion. It appeals to the affable emotions of the eye; it has a social ease and facility and a kind of inexhaustible ability and universal adequacy. But color as the revelation by light of the world in which we live; color as a flight, a richness, an evasion and escape from the surface of living; color as an approach, through the greatness or delicacy of tone, to the range of music; color as a poignancy, a force, an originality, a shock, from an artist's own depths; Sargent has not.

I walk through these rooms of painting, the water-colors too in the corridor, and see all over again that Sargent is an astonishing painter. How he glances over the world and what a mistake it is to think of him only as a painter of portraits! I think how well two or three of those canvasses will look when a century of time and dust and light have done their work. I am all admiration, and I am a little tired. People around me are praising with animation; I feel indifferent, and begin to think of vistas, music and poetry, and to think—unfairly—of painting that is purer. Sargent's is pure painting, more or less; in so far as concerns its seeming indifference to the meaning or implication or poetry or sentiment of his subject matter, it may be pure painting. But the purity must go a great deal farther, farther into great design, line, color. And this can ultimately derive, however remotely, only from great content. I get a kind of nomadic, divine discontent as I look at these lively yards on yards of paint.

Presently I settle on a picture that seems to promise an illustration of what for me the trouble is with these paintings. On a smallish canvas Sargent has made a painting of a scene somewhere, the Tyrol perhaps. At the back rise mountains, with a stretch of middle ground, and then on a little level and in the foreground a graveyard with its array of crosses and slight memorials upon the graves. I look at this picture. It has the same aplomb, the same indifference, the same adequacy and brushwork, the same cosmopolitan and sophisticated bounce, the same energy, as any other picture to be seen nearby, as the walk in front of the villa, the little dog's head, the lady rising out of her satin bodice. Very well then, Sargent has a right to remain unmoved by this scene. From the picture I can guess what was there when the painter took up his brush and his vivacious palette: the towering mountains of the world above those graves of men, with their crosses and shells and slanting stakes and wreaths put there by the living; the high land, the sky, the dead, the remembrance. I should think that perhaps in any event for any artist some noble flowing line would above all things appear in the mountains and might be caught and given an accent and permanence of its own. Or some pitiful frailty in the crosses and wreaths. Or there would be in the light upon that scene some wistful elegiac hint, something lightly done, if you wish, like Meleager's cry "I beseech thee, Earth, that nurturest all, gently to clasp her, O Mother, to thy breast." Or something of Plato's poem of him who was in his life the morning star of the living, and now in death the evening star of the dead. I think of Damascius' epigram,

> Zosime, who was once a slave in body alone, for her body too is now free.

Or there might be bitter comments on this scene, infinite moods, Gothic, macabre, brutal, dryly literal. But Sargent's is scarcely a mood at all. Very well then, we may ask of him to set down the very reality of that air and light and high swinging land and that plot of graves. He may leave out sentiment if he can catch the scene exactly, better than the camera. We shall get our own mood, whatever it is, out of such representation. But not this bright brush and empty sketching!

Painting is painting, is its own defence; that point arises but is not new. Obviously painting is painting and no other art. I am not asking that this picture of Sargent's have a meaning or a story or a theme. I am not asking the suggestion of sad associations or of any literary values introduced into the art of painting. I am asking only this: that in painting terms—the purer the better so far as I am concerned—in line, color, design, Sargent give us the sign of some quality of life aroused in him by that scene, and not go, as they say in the Bhagavad-Gita, like a spoon through the soup without perceiving the savor. Sargent may give us as much representation, as much mere likeness, or as little as he chooses, an inspired photograph or a single line, a copy or a pattern; what I am asking is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that translated into this medium of painting I find the record or impact of some form of life that was induced by that experience and that is something more than a casual and bright chatter. I am asking that in terms of the art of painting I get the expression of some quality or other that in the art of words we might call poignancy, or bitterness, or austerity, or fatality, or pathos, or mockery, or rapture, or whatever the case might be, so long as it cut into life and experience. In other words I am merely asking that Sargent's painting in itself, free of everything outside itself, free of the scene, if you like, should give me some greater access of life.

STARK YOUNG.

Snowfall

Heaven is hell, if it be as they say,
All endless day.
A pen of terrible radiance on whose walls
No shadow falls,
No sunset ever comes because no sun has ever risen,
Where, like bewildered flies,
Poor immortalities
Interminably crawl, caught in a crystal prison.

Yet, if there is but night to recompense
Our impotence,
How can we bear to live so long and know
The end is so?
Creatures that dread the dark to utter dark descending?
The worm's dull enmity,
To feel it—but not see!
To be afraid at night and know that night unending!

There is a time when, though the sun be weak,
It is not bleak
With perfect and intolerable light,
Nor has the night
Yet put the eyes to sleep that do not wish for slumber;
When, on the city we know,
The pale, transmuting snow
Falls softly, in sighing flakes, immaculate, without number.

Whisperingly it comes, and whisperingly
Fills earth and sky
With fragile petals, tranquil as a swan's
Blanch pinions.
And where it falls is silence, subtle and mild.
That silence is not cruel,
But calm as a frozen jewel,
And clasped to its cool, frail breast, Earth sucks in rest
like a child.

If there can be a heaven, let it wear
Even such an air.
Not shamed with sun, nor black without a ray,
But gently day.
A tired street whereon the snow falls whitely.
An infant, cradled in fleece,
An ancient, drowsy with peace,
Unutterable peace, too pure to shine too brightly.

STEPHEN VINCENT BENÉT.

CORRESPONDENCE

What Is a Nation?

SIR: Your editorial in the issue of February 27 on the immigration question is interesting but I am inclined to think that the writer is in error on this point. You suggest the latest available naturalization statistics as a specific proof of assimilation for the several nations. Now, I should like to have your opinion as to whether the state and the nation are identical, also as to whether naturalization papers would mean that one is assimilated.

The reason I am eager to have your explanation is because a study on the very same question recently led me to believe that a nation and a state are not the same, that people who are bound together by one government and similar interests are not necessarily members of one homogeneous nation. If this were true then all others like the Masons or the Ku Klux Klan could call themselves "nations." Moreover, I believe that the best definition of the word "nation" would be a union of peoples who have "common memories, common ideals, besides a physical relationship." This, I believe, is Lord Morley's definition.

Now, I should also like to ask the writer of the editorial as to what benefit the American people would derive from the substitution of its common memory for the common memory of other nationalities? What benefit would the American people derive from substituting a George Washington for a Garibaldi in a person's mind? What benefit would the American people derive from having a person sing "Barney Google" instead of "Woman is Fickle?"

I think the writer of the editorial is behind his time. Today, we are striving for a democracy which does away with the right of the half plus one to dominate the half minus one. For one group to force its culture upon the minority group is unjust. Why, then should he champion the establishment of a homogeneous nation by undemocratic means?

NATHAN C. MARON.

Indiana Harbor, Indiana.

[The New Republic does not regard state and nation as identical. It is well aware of the existence of polyglot multi-national states, and of the problems that arise in the political life of those states. It sees no advantage in duplicating those problems on American soil.

Nor does the New Republic desire to force American citizenship or assimilation to American ways of living and thinking upon anyone. It does not wish to compel anyone to substitute Washington for Garibaldi or even Mussolini. It does believe that in selecting among prospective immigrants it is wise to give preference to those who are sufficiently awake to desire to learn the language of the country, its history and its institutions, and to prepare themselves to take part in its political life. If they retain in their memories also the virtues of Garibaldi and the music of Verdi, so much the better. In fact, we should see small reason for admitting immigrants at all if we did not believe that they bring with them spiritual values along with their labor power.—THE EDITORS.]

Conservation Triumphant

SIR: If there is a Providence which concerns itself with the affairs of men, it would seem to cherish a special affection for the Pinchot-Roosevelt conservation policies. Certainly, their present favorable status before the public cannot be attributed to the existence of an intelligent and steadily watchful public sentiment. Twice since their formulation as a public policy have they seemed to be on the point of being abandoned, and twice have they been dramatically rescued. The first attempt, under the Taft administration, led to the temporary disruption of the most powerful of our political parties, and brought it about that for the six or eight most important years of our history since the Civil War, the Republican party and its leaders were reduced to the abject necessity of playing a secondary rôle.

The results of the second attempt are now beginning to be unrolled before us. Heartened by a seven million majority in the popular vote, and in accordance with its private understanding of the slogan, more business in government and less government in business, the present administration proceeded to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

give what might well have been the deathblow to conservation. But Providence had other plans. If the psalmist is right in saying that God laughs in His heaven, then there must have been an outburst of ironic laughter there, when an unsuspecting and well-intentioned President, with the aid and consent of the responsible party leaders, loaded up his Cabinet of "best minds" with a Secretary of the Interior in personal financial difficulties and with a penchant for "borrowing"; with a Secretary of the Navy even more stupid than the average politician; and with an Attorney-General upon whose professional weakness and intellectual incompetence there seems to have been superadded a very liberal standard of personal honor. These appointments having paved the way for a sensational public scandal, of the kind that even the man on the street can understand and grow resentful over, the revelation was again providentially delayed until the very eve of a presidential campaign. Could even Roosevelt himself have managed things better than that?

A minor irony is furnished in the part played by the two Roosevelt boys. After having stupidly collaborated, each in his own way, to "stab" their father's most cherished policy "in the back" (borrowing a Rooseveltian phrase for the description of an un-Rooseveltian performance), they unwittingly become the instrumentalities through which public sentiment is first precipitated against the policy which both had up to that moment aided and abetted, stupidly and innocently no doubt, but still in no very strong spirit of loyalty to their father's faith.

Is there any logic in politics? If there is, and the Republican party really wishes to stave off defeat, and prevent the foundation of a third party which may possibly become a major factor in our political life, why should it not renounce the timid and slender hope which is attached to the nomination of Calvin Coolidge, and instead prove the sincerity of its present spasm of reform by nominating for President its one logical choice in this crisis, Gifford Pinchot?

DAVID F. SWENSON.

Minneapolis.

Christian Science and Vaccination

SIR: My attention has been called to an article appearing in your February 13 issue criticizing persons who, for religous reasons, do not believe in the use of vaccines. While the Christian Science religion is not specifically mentioned, it is, however, quite generally known that the multiplied thousands of intelligent people who go to make up the adherents of this denomination are conscientiously opposed to compulsory vaccination. They are likewise opposed to the unproved theory that inoculation with poisonous serums prevents and heals disease. Such theory is, I may add, not only unproved, but as the result of extended experimentation by the medical fraternity itself may agree that it has been convincingly disproved. For instance, no less an authority in medical circles than Dr. Carlo Ruata, Professor of Materia Medica, University of Perugia, Italy, has said, "Were it not for the calamitous practice, smallpox would have been stamped out years ago and would have disappeared. Believe not in vaccination; it is a world-wide delusion, an unscientific practice, a fatal superstition whose consequences are measured by thousands of dead and wounded, by tears and sorrow without end."

CHARLES E. HEITMAN,
Christian Science Committee on Publication.

New York City.

Historical Vision in 1910

SIR: In volume XII of the Cambridge Modern History there is a chapter entitled The Modern Law of Nations and the Prevention of War. At the close of this chapter, written by the Historian Sir Frederick Pollock, I find the following comment relative to the outlook for the establishment of an "ideal system of Europe":

> It would seem that the formation of any such system can be looked for only when the political institutions and ideas prevailing in the chief nations of the world have become much more nearly uniform than they are; and it is far from clear that the present tendency is to approximation, for the fashion—a passing one let us hope— is rather to exaggerate national and racial differences.

We are rightly enthusiastic about the value to civilization of new truths discovered by physical and biological scientists. What would *this new truth*, expressed by a great social scientist in a volume published in 1910, have been worth to the world if it had been fully and immediately apprehended?

F. S. RODKEY.

Oxford, Ohio.

The Bok Plan, Pro and Con

SIR: Having read, in your correspondence columns, of how a referendum on the Bok Plan was held in another college, I feel it justifiable to point with pride to the procedure at Iowa State College.

A group of students arranged that addresses be given for and against the plan by as able speakers as could be had. On two successive days Harvey Ingham, of the Des Moines Register, and Walter Clyde Jones of Chicago spoke before the college at special convocations; only on the third day was there balloting. One third of the students' ballots, and three fourths of those of the instructors, were affirmative. Too much weight should not be attached to these results; but they show, at least, that an important issue was used to stimulate independent thought, not to discourage it.

EDWARD S. ALLEN.

Ames, Iowa.

"Increasing the National Wealth"

SIR: Professor David Friday's article on increasing the national wealth deals in gratifying totals which I see no reason for refusing to accept. He is a careful statistician with a wide sweep of thought, and doubtless comes as near to being accurate as can be expected of any human being.

There are, however, several assumptions in his review which seem to be not without significance and lead me to ask the question whether or not some of the increment included in Professor Friday's totals does not represent debt instead of wealth.

If I "save" $1,000 a year and deposit the money in a bank, I certainly expect to get it back. When the money is placed out on interest by the bank, the cautious gentlemen who have charge of its affairs certainly expect to have it repaid so that they can discharge their obligation to me. The loan granted by them after I have placed my money in their hands presumably went for the making of goods or the rendering of services, against which I now have a claim in place of the original goods or services which made it possible for me to get the $1,000 to begin with. My deposit would be regarded as wealth by the rules of ordinary business economics, and so would the goods against which I have a claim. On the books of the business community it looks as if one could have his cake and eat it, too.

In addition, the interest accumulating gives me further rights to goods and services. That interest, however, does not represent effort on my part but work by someone else. It is the accumulation of interest on unusual claims for goods and services that confuses people into thinking that "saving" and the creation of wealth are the same thing. Increase in wealth depends on something quite different from saving, for the very obvious reason that there first must be something to save.

There are two ways, and only two, of increasing wealth—discovery of natural forces (with invention), and the more efficient organization of labor. My $1,000 comes out of labor and discovery, that is, is made possible by what the discoverer, the inventor and the properly directed worker does. If I give up my claim to goods and services (that is, money) to help build a fertilizer factory, let us say, I certainly have helped to increase national wealth, if the fertilizer will result in bigger crops that go to swell the stream of goods flowing from producer to consumer. But if I insist on having my money back again, plus interest, all I have really done is helped to increase the community's debt, although my own claim to wealth from the community has been enhanced.

If I keep up the process long enough, adding interest at six percent to principal by compounding I can double the debt to me in twelve years. At simple interest I can double it in about seventeen years.

How long will science and invention and efficient labor management be able to keep up the process of doubling wealth every seventeen years to repay its loan made from me as a saver?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As a small-fry financier I ought to know how far my saving habits are economically sound, lest by confusing wealth and debt I find myself ultimately in the position of the creditor who has claims but not sufficient goods discoverable to levy upon.

If the other lenders will ask the same question we may get a clearer idea of how much real net gain there is to secure our claims against the community. Incidentally, the community may also discover whether by working diligently it has increased its wealth more than its debt or vice versa.

Professor Friday would be doing us thrifty people who read the bankers' advertisements a service by giving us some figures showing how far we can go in expecting to get anything out of becoming depositors in the nearest savings bank.

HERBERT J. FOSTER.

Portland, Oregon.

"The Paradox of Woodrow Wilson"

SIR: Reading the editorial on The Paradox of Woodrow Wilson in your issue of February 13, I am struck with certain passages which reveal what seem to me to be two rather fundamental—and unfortunately widespread—misconceptions of Wilson the President and Wilson the Peacemaker.

You lay stress on the "discrepancies" between Mr. Wilson's opinions as a student of our government and his practice as President. I submit that seldom if ever in our history (with the possible exception of Hamilton) has there appeared a statesman who was more deliberate in his attempt to put his long-standing and carefully weighed political opinions into practice. Indeed, I would suggest that herein lies an important implication of what Mr. Wilson himself meant by his much-maligned "one-track mind."

It is interesting to read his earlier writings with this in mind. Apparently Mr. Wilson reached all his conclusions slowly and only after the most painstaking research but, once established in mind, his opinions were seldom altered. Especially illuminating, for example, is the chapter on The Executive in the well-known volume called Congressional Government, said to have been prepared as a Ph. D. thesis in 1884. One notes particularly the insistence on "power and strict accountability for its use" and the necessity for creating a real responsibility for legislation by a more definite concentration of the authority of the administration on the floor of Congress (ideas having an important bearing on Wilson the President which your editorial certainly does not acknowledge). Whether it is a virtue in a political leader to take office with a set of predigested notions as to how that office should be conducted I do not pretend to say, but I feel sure that as time goes on, as Mr. Wilson's private correspondence is made public, and as biographical studies multiply, the extraordinary deliberation with which he proceeded to put his governmental theories into practice will become more and more apparent.

Again, I take exception to the maner in which you play up Mr. Wilson's paradoxical stubbornness in trying to force the Treaty down the throats of his countrymen after being so "flexible" with his colleagues in framing it. Was he really so "flexible" as he is represented as being? The striking difference in the critical attitude with which the French people and the American people came to view Mr. Wilson's activities at the Peace Conference constitutes a paradox which has never been adequately emphasized. Anyone who followed the French press during the proceedings of the Peace Conference knows that Mr. Wilson was made the butt of a very deliberate and violent propaganda for the single and simple purpose of discounting the influence of America in the Settlement. I doubt if the Kaiser himself in his palmiest days could have boasted of a more complete and successful control of public opinion through the press than was enjoyed by M. Clemenceau during the first six months of 1919. Repeatedly in all the more important French newspapers sentences, paragraphs, and sometimes whole columns of articles pertaining to the Peace Conference were found blanked out by the censor. And often the context which was permitted to stand indicated all too clearly that the objectionable matter was something too favorable to Wilson and America rather than something derogatory to France. On the other hand the vilest slurs against the Americans were printed freely. "Down with Wilson!" was the cry on all hands, "America trying to dominate Europe!" "Wilson dictating the terms of the Treaty!" "La France roulee par Doctor Wilson!" was shouted from every sheet. Even the best-known editorial writers lent themselves to this fervent propaganda, caring nothing for consistency or sincerity in their eagerness to convince the French people that Wilson was a colossal villain who proposed to rob France of the fruits of victory and to make Europe a political and economic dependency of the United States. They even said America was more of a menace to the security of the Republic than the Boche! And our "Wilsonian Idealism" was represented as a cloak for selfish and far-reaching motives as sinister as they were subtle.

In his own country, on the other hand, Wr. Wilson was almost universally berated for meekly permitting the European diplomats to walk all over him.

Obviously Mr. Wilson could not have been both dictatorial and compromising, both too stubborn and too "flexible" and yet the fact that he was becoming unpopular with large groups of people in America gave the French grounds to rejoice that America was not as determined as they thought she was and the fact that he stirred up such bitter opposition in Europe led Americans to believe he must not be as strong as he ought to be. And neither French nor American public opinion has ever taken intelligent cognizance of the real reasons for the opposition he encountered here and abroad.

Also, is there not something a bit ghoulish in the attempt to psycho-analyze (however sketchily) the mind of a great national figure when his bones are barely ten days cold?

ARTEMAS PACKARD.

Boston, Massachussetts.

A Non-Supporter of The Freeman

SIR: One of your regular readers who admired much in the Freeman; one, may I add, having no illusions politically and who has no superstitions re "constructive" thinking; would like to inform you why he did not support the Freeman.

As an instance: during the first few months of the Ruhr invasion the Freeman devoted precious little space to that important event. The amenities of Lord Curzon and other Englishmen were apparently more deserving of their kind attention. The anger of certain English politicians, of all the parties, over the Ruhr invasion was a source of considerable "innocent merriment" to them.

The naive assumption behind the ignoring of the Ruhr was, I take it, that if the situation only becomes bad enough—thoroughly bad—why something delightfully upsetting will happen.

A Poincaré government accordingly helps to bring the millenium nearer, a MacDonald-Asquith régime wards it off. We, therefore, must turn our guns on the Britishers; a most gratifying conclusion to any real, one hundred percent, red-blooded American.

CHARLES E. PARRISH.

Palm Beach, Florida.

Tax-Exemption and Public Improvements

SIR: In your discussion of the tax exempt securities, you have overlooked one aspect of the exemption feature that is of considerable moment to the small taxpayer. Because they are exempt from federal income tax, county and municipal bonds, issued to pay for the construction of roads, schools, water-works and similar improvements, carry a lower interest rate and sell at a higher price in the bond market than non-exempt bonds of equal security and desirability.

If the exemption feature were eliminated from county and municipal bonds, the farmer and the small home-owner may be sure that the federal income tax on bond earnings will be passed on to them in the form of a lower market value of the bonds and a demand by the bond buyer for higher interest rates. The effect of taxing such securities would be to increase the cost of needed improvements (schools, for example) by an amount equal to the federal tax on the bonds—surely not a desideratum.

P. M. E.

Banning, California.

[We have recognized that tax-exemption works to raise the price of bonds and so to cheapen money for public improvements. The practical question is one of degree. Does tax-exemption result in a sufficient lowering of the interest rate to compensate for the loss in revenue? It would, perhaps, if the volume were so small as to be absorbed entirely by the tax evaders. This, however, is not true of existing issues.—THE EDITORS.]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An Introduction to Social Psychology

Psychology and Primitive Culture, by F. C. Bartlett. New York: The Macmillan Company. $2.75.

FOR some years now the psychologists have been interesting themselves in those curious manifestations of the human mind which become apparent when men congregate together. That there are differences between the reactions of the individual as such, and the individual as a member of a social group, has been understood for some time, and we have such works as those by Trotter, LeBon, Williams, and, of course, William MacDougall, all of which testify to the complexity of the phenomena and the efforts to find some explanation for them. But these attempts have been far from satisfying, and the attacks which appear from time to time upon all such statements, especially those of MacDougall, show how the problem still bewilders those who study it. It has seemed that in this, as in so many other pioneer attempts at devising explanations, the main trouble has been a desire on the part of students of social psychology to settle once for all the underlying motives which cause men to react as they do, and these vary from the serious list of instincts which MacDougall presents to the caricature of the subject given by James Mickle Williams.

What has been lacking, however, in all these discussions, has been an understanding of the importance of culture itself as a determining force in shaping social behavior. Added to this there has been an unwillingness to consider concrete data; in the search for the broadest bases, intensive studies were scorned; in a word, the student was unable to see the trees for the forest. A little book just published gives great promise as a pathfinder in the maze of speculation. While there are many commendable points in his treatment that might be discussed, Mr. Bartlett has made his greatest contribution by the injection of the historical method into the subject, and, like the cultural anthropologists, who study social phenomena of other types, he has profitable recourse to primitive people for his examples. For it is in the study of these, he maintains, that psychology has erred most grievously. The psychologist's explanations of contemporary behavior, we are told, generally are based on observed antecedents. It is only when he studies primitive man that he seeks remote origins,—only in this field that he has forsaken the scientific pathway for huge generalizations. And such speculative procedure must stop; "our attempt in general is to understand antecedent conditions of response." Therefore, for an understanding of the social psychology of both modern and primitive groups, "modifications of response arising within a given social group during the period under consideration must be explained."

And this, of course, is the historical method of attempting to account for the behavior of a group by no other means than the antecedent experiences of that group. For, as Mr. Bartlett points out at length, the social psychologists have made the mistake of trying to add the instinctive reactions of one man to those of another and another and yet another, and thus explain the resulting action of a social group. In doing so, they commit a fallacy as grievous as that of the early economists with their "economic man." For society is more than one individual plus another and another; it is all of these plus the interaction of their temperaments, and plus, again, the society which they form. A society, students of primitive man have recognized both in primitive groups and, as Mr. Bartlett emphasizes, in our own, is built upon traditions, mores, customs, that go to form a pattern of behavior, and this pattern holds the members of the group who live according to it so strongly, that no actions on the part of the group can be accounted for without reckoning on it. A simple example suffices: if a group in our own society has a grievance to redress, the ways of going about it are rigid,—a meeting is held, a committee to draw resolutions is appointed, the resolutions are later voted upon, and, if accepted, they are sent to the proper authorities. Does the African adopt the same method? He would never dream of doing so,—a respected elderly man harangues the chief publicly, and, if two or three warnings do not suffice to remedy the trouble, the people take matters in their own hands. But what would happen to the violator of our pattern, should he accost President Coolidge on the steps of the White House and take him to task for certain failures?

The basic instinctive reactions, or, rather, the "social relationship tendencies" which Mr. Bartlett feels motivate human beings may be reduced to three: "primitive comradeship," assertiveness, and submissiveness. He maintains that one of the three will be generally characteristic of a group as a whole, and will determine its relationship to other groups. Individual variability is not overlooked, but rather stressed. However, to use his phrase, it is the "group difference tendencies" which are important in the study of social phenomena, and the relationships which result from conflicts between groups are determined by the cultural "set" of the group. This postulation of three principal motivating forces would indicate, on the face of it, a tendency on the part of Mr. Bartlett to drop back into the common fallacy of the social psychologists mentioned above, but a reading of his work soon puts such a fear at rest. He first makes a study of the folk story as a social fact, and shows how the tendency of a group to shape its folk tales so as to mirror its own life demonstrates that the tale is purely a social product. His attempt to show how it exhibits the three "fundamental" tendencies shown above is not as convincing as the rest of his discussion, the main portion of which is made up of a consideration of the psychological forces which go to make up the transmission and elaboration of culture.

This is a problem that has puzzled many students. We know today that one of the outstanding facts about culture is the ease with which it spreads. Indeed, certain cultural facts are so widely diffused that some writers feel that a given trait can only have been invented once, and wherever found has been carried by one means or another. But how are these traits adopted into a culture? What is the role of the individual in introducing them? To what extent do they change? And when an invention is made, how is it taken up and developed? All of these questions are considered, and the author finds that it is only through the careful, intensive study of concrete data that their answers can be found. And he believes that when they are found, it will be somewhere along the working of these three tendencies on the social background of the given society in which they are studied.

The attempt of Mr. Bartlett must be highly commended. He has gone about his task in a careful methodical way that leaves few loose ends. Indeed, one might almost rail at him for being too pedantic and wordy, if one did not feel that, in the light of the works which have gone be-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fore his, too much care cannot be exercised in the presentation of his subject. His work is of interest as the first out of England which utilizes the vast store of concrete information which the American anthropologists have laid up for just such workers as he. The study is not diffuse, and his concrete data and examples are all drawn from a few sources of the highest order,—Boas on the Indians of the Northwest coast, Radin on the Winnebago, Smith and Dale on the Ba-Ila of Africa, Spencer and Gillin on the Australian tribes. Naturally, in a short work of such breadth as this, there are many points to which one might take exception. But with social psychology in the parlous state in which it now is, one may be thankful that an attempt at a method which promises to be fruitful has been expounded, and leave the criticisms for later developments which may result from the use of this method.

MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS.

Wallace Stevens and E. E. Cummings

Tulips and Chimneys, by E. E. Cummings. New York: Thomas Seltzer. $2.00.

Harmonium, by Wallace Stevens. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. $2.00.

MR. WALLACE STEVENS is the master of a style: that is the most remarkable thing about him. His gift for combining words is fantastic but sure: even when you do not know what he is saying, you know that he is saying it well. He derives plainly from several French sources of the last fifty years but he never—except for a fleeting phrase or two—really sounds like any of them. You could not mistake even a title by Wallace Stevens for a title by anyone else: Invective Against Swans, Hibiscus on the Sleeping Shores, A High-Toned Old Christian Woman, The Emperor of Ice-Cream, Exposition of the Contents of a Cab, The Bird with the Coppery Keen Claws, Two Figures in Dense Violet Night, Hymn from a Watermelon Pavilion, and Frogs Eat Butterflies. Snakes Eat Frogs. Hogs Eat Snakes. Men Eat Hogs.

These titles also represent Mr. Stevens's curious ironic imagination at its very best. The poems themselves—ingenious, charming and sometimes beautiful as they are—do not always quite satisfy the expectation aroused by the titles. When you read a few poems of Mr. Stevens, you get the impression from the richness of his verbal imagination that he is a poet of rich personality, but when you come to read the whole volume through you are struck by a sort of aridity. Mr. Stevens, who is so observant and has so distinguished a fancy, seems to have emotion neither in abundance nor in intensity. He is ironic a little in Mr. Eliot's manner; but he is not poignantly, not tragically ironic. Emotion seems to emerge only furtively in the cryptic images of his poetry, as if it had been driven, as he seems to hint, into the remotest crannies of sleep or disposed of by being dexterously turned into exquisite amusing words. Nothing could be more perfect in its tone and nothing by itself could be more satisfactory than such a thing as Last Looks at the Lilacs. But when we have gone all through Mr. Stevens, we find ourselves putting to him the same question which he, in the last poem of his book, puts To a Roaring Wind:

> What syllable are you seeking,
> Vocallissimus,
> In the distances of sleep?
> Speak it.

Mr. E. E. Cummings, on the other hand, is not, like Mr. Stevens, a master in a peculiar vein; a master is precisely what he is not. Cummings's style is an eternal adolescent, as fresh and often as winning but as half-baked as boyhood. A poet with a genuine gift for language, for a melting music a little like Shelley's which sighs and rhapsodizes in soft light vowels disembarrassed of their baggage of consonants, he strikes often on ætherial measures of a singular purity and charm—his best poems seem to dissolve on the mind like the flakes of a lyric dew; but he seems never to know when he is writing badly and when he is writing well. He has apparently no faculty for self-criticism. One imagines him giving off his poems as spontaneously as perspiration and with as little application of the intellect. One imagines him chuckling with the delight of a school-boy when he has invented an adverb like "sayingly" or hit upon the idea of writing capitals in the middles of words instead of at the beginnings. One imagines him just as proud to have written

> last we
> on the groaning flame of neat huge
> trudging kiss moistly climbing hideously with
> large
> minute
> hips, O
> .press

as:

> On such a night the sea through her blind miles
> of crumbling silence

or the sonnet about the little dancer

> absatively posolutely dead,
> like Coney Island in winter.

And there is really, it seems to me, a certain amateurishness about the better of these specimens of his style as well as about the worse. Just as in the first example he takes one of the lines of least resistance with a difficult sensation by setting down indiscriminately all the ideas it suggests to him without ever really taking pains to focus it for the reader, so in the second he succumbs to an overindulgence in the beautiful English long i which from "I arise from dreams of thee" to Mr. T. S. Eliot's nightingale filling "all the desert with inviolable voice" has been reserved for effects of especial brightness or purity but which Mr. Cummings has cheapened a little by pounding on it too much. One or two accurately placed long i's, if combined with other long vowels, are usually enough by themselves to illuminate a poem, but Mr. Cummings is addicted to long i's, he has got into the habit of using them uncritically, and he insists upon turning them on all over until his poems are lit up like Christmas trees.

Mr. Cummings's eccentric punctuation is, I think, typical of his immaturity as an artist. It is not merely a question of unconventional punctuation: unconventional punctuation very often gains its effect. But I must contend, after a sincere effort to appreciate it and after having had it explained to me by a friend of Mr. Cummings, that Mr. Cummings's does not gain its effect. It is Mr. Cummings's theory that punctuation marks, capitalization and arrangement on the page should be used not as mere conventional indications of structure which make it easier

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for the reader to pay attention to the meaning conveyed by the words themselves but as independent instruments of expression susceptible of infinite variation. Thus he refuses to make use of capitals for the purposes for which they were invented—to indicate the beginnings of sentences and the occurrence of proper names—but insists upon pressing them into service for purposes of emphasis; and he even demotes the first person singular of the pronoun by a small i, only printing it as a capital when he desires to give it special salience—not, apparently, realizing that for readers accustomed to seeing it the other way it calls ten times as much attention to "I" to write it as a small letter than to print it in the ordinary fashion. But the really serious case against Mr. Cummings's punctuation is that the results which it yields are ugly. His poems are hideous on the page. He insists upon shattering even the most conventional and harmless of his productions, which if they had their deserts would appear in neat little boxes like the innocuous correct prose poems of Mr. Logan Pearsall Smith, into an explosive system of fragments which, so far from making the cadences easier to follow only involves us in a jig-saw puzzle of putting them together again. In the long run, I think it may be said that words have to carry their own cadence and emphasis through the order in which they are written. The extent to which punctuation and typography can help out is really very limited.

Behind this formidable barrier of punctuation for which Mr. Cummings seems unfortunately to have achieved most celebrity, his emotions are conventional and simple in the extreme. They even verge occasionally on the banal. You have the adoration of young love and the delight in the coming of spring and you have the reflection that all flesh must die and all "roses" turn to "ashes." But this is perhaps precisely where Mr. Cummings has an advantage over Mr. Stevens. Whatever Cummings is he is not chilled; he is not impervious to life. He responds eagerly and unconstrainedly to all that the world has to offer. His poetry constitutes an expression—and for the most part a charming expression—of a kind very rare in America—it is the record of a temperament which loves and enjoys, which responds readily with mockery or tenderness, entirely without the inhibitions from which so much of American writing is merely the anguish to escape. He is one of the only American authors living who is not reacting against something. And for this example of the good life—and for the fact that, after all, he is a poet at a time when there is a great deal of writing of verse and very little real poetic feeling—Mr. Cummings deserves well of the public.

EDMUND WILSON.

Plutarch Lied

Plutarch Lied, Translated from the French of Jean de Pierrefeu by Jeffery E. Jeffery. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. $2.50.

THIS book is by the author of "G. Q. G." The former book was an extremely interesting account of his personal experiences at French G. H. Q. by the accomplished writer of the official communiqués. The present book, written in an entertaining and original way, consolidates the conclusions drawn by the author from those experiences.

M. de Pierrefeu is not a professional officer. His present object is to prove, by examples taken systematically through the war, that the graduate staff officers of the Ecole de Guerre were not in touch with military realities, but were obsessed with the fixed idea of always attacking. In this the author sees a real danger to France, and being as much convinced of another war with Germany as any other Frenchman, he demands greater civilian collaboration in military preparations. He is also convinced that the "continuous front"—that is to say, a fortified front without flanks—will be reëstablished at the outbreak of the next Franco-German war, and in this contingency he is especially alarmed by the attack doctrine, on account of the relatively greater losses suffered by the French when they attacked frontally in the recent war.

He does not believe that the continuous front can be broken at all in the face of determined resistance, or at least that any local break-through can be exploited, except in the case of enormous numerical superiority on the attacker's side. What he is afraid of, therefore, is that the attack doctrine held by the graduates of the Ecole de Guerre will lead them to attack with forces too weak, as he believes they have often done before. He points out, for instance, that Ludendorff was unable to exploit his breakthroughs in 1918, because Foch would not evacuate the salients formed by Ludendorff's pockets, and the good morale of the French infantry enabled them to hold on in a new continuous front around those pockets. Ludendorff's own withdrawals later in the year the author attributes to low morale on the part both of the German staff and the German infantry.

"Only on condition that the attacker possesses superiority in numbers, in material, and in confidence," he says, "is victory possible." To these factors should be added training. But these are exactly the factors which the French army is now trying to assure—by keeping the German army in a low state numerically, materially, morally and in training, and conversely by keeping their own forces in a high state of efficiency.

If in the future this balance of efficiency should be lost to France a defensive policy would be necessary, as the author sees. But since the factor of confidence depends largely on a policy of attack, it is not likely that the French staff will give up this policy, but rather that they will seek superiority in the other factors by alliances, as they are already doing now.

The author's most valuable criticism is that which deprecates the fixed idea of attacking at all costs, and in face of realities. This is a dangerous tendency in all armies. But the fact remains that the military history of the past proves that the offensive spirit is indispensable to success. The question is not attack or defence; the policy of attack as a policy has always reigned supreme. The problem really is to know where daring ends, and recklessness begins.

A deficiency of the author is his underemphasizing and often ignoring of training. Nor does he seem to realize that a long preparatory service in command of small units is considered requisite to the experience of all professional officers, whether assigned eventually to the staff or not. Professional staff officers are not a class apart. No professional officer, staff or line, would agree with M. de Pierrefeu—granted the requisite superiority—that the attack is necessarily more costly than the defence, or that a continuous fortified front could not be broken. For certainly the Germans often lost less in attack than their opponents did in defence, due principally to superiority in training; and the continuous fortified front, both East and West, was actually broken at different times by both the combatants.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In conclusion, it is only fair to observe that while M. de Pierrefeu primarily wrote this book in deadly earnest, and while it demands serious criticism, he also intended that his readers should never be bored. In this he has been eminently successful. X.

Episodes Before Thirty

Episodes Before Thirty, by Algernon Blackwood. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. $3.00.

WHEN a man walks about with his head habitually in the clouds of glamour, magic and the occult generally, one is tempted to ask: How about his feet? When a Blackwood has spent years among the "Dark Powers" in "Other Places," one is prompted to inquire: How does he connect up with the environment and experiences of the common man? The present book satisfies our demands—in so far, at least, as it portrays the formative years of an exceptional nature. This period covers the author's twenties—brings him, indeed, to thirty: so sheltered, through an ill-judged education, was his youth, and so slow was he in reaching an adequate acquaintance with this world of ours and with the men and women inhabiting it. The decade here dealt with alternates between Canada and New York City, with mistaken business adventures in the one case and a rather horrifying newspaper apprenticeship in the other. In either instance nothing, seemingly, is withheld. Mr. Blackwood celebrated his thirtieth birthday by a long-delayed return to his aristocratic relatives in England.

He is fond of the word "episode." He used it to describe an early novel, Julius LeVallon, an elaborate study of reincarnation which easily justifies a more pretentious appellation; and he uses it again, in the plural, for the title of the present volume. But this is by no means the looseknit thing that such an epithet would indicate. Taking away some ninety or a hundred pages of matter introductory and a like number of pages supplementary, a single central episode indeed remains, but this is handled and developed and unified with the practised hand of the complete fictionist. It exhibits that rare type, the artist in the underworld, and it offers us a fantastic fairyland of misery and misfortune. Specifically, it demonstrates to what depths of demoralization and depravity a young Englishman of family, the author's close associate, may sink when at a disadvantage in a new and unaccustomed environment. Incidentally, it may present an apologia, however belated, for the author himself: longer books have been written for the sake of a defence involving only a few pages, or even a few paragraphs. Or another reason for an amazingly outspoken book may be ventured: as Mr. Blackwood himself implies (and as any large public library will make manifest) his peculiar fiction has had no wide currency; why not, then, in view of prevailing conditions, try the revelations implicit in a frank autobiography?

A side-by-side reading of these pages with their author's large body of brief fiction throws some interesting light on his methods as a writer of short stories, as well as on the innate, inevitable slant of his mind. He must have his horrors, and he must juggle with time and space. He spent a rather happy year, as a boy of fifteen, with the worthy Moravian Brothers in the Black Forest; yet when he comes to write of them in his Secret Worshippers he makes them worshippers of the Devil, and though they are all long since dead he has them survive as a "concourse of shells of violent men" who are celebrating a ghostly Black Mass, even after the village elders have driven them out and destroyed their seat. The Listener was suggested by the proximity of two dubious Germans in a New York rooming-house, but the scene is shifted to sinister lodgings in London and a spectral leper is thrown in for good measure. Acquaintance with a corrupt, indolent and self-advertising detective during reportorial days in New York defied transplantation from the city itself; and in the story of Max Hensig, bacteriologist and poisoner, the "accumulated horror of the years in New York" not only finds its "expression," as the author says, but its inescapable locale.

Mr. Blackwood is hardly of the daylight breed. Dreams and hauntings took early possession of him. The shadow of the gruesome and the equivocal provides his habitual retreat. Ghosts are good company; the psychical and the mystical seem his preferred atmosphere. But he is not quite so persistent a dweller as Machen in the purlieus of the horrific and the forbidden; for he has lighter moments in which he can toss off such ingenious trifles as If the Cap Fits and A Victim of Higher Space. Yet, when all's said, he might be willing to stand or fall on his creation of John Silence, or even on the first of the tales involving that "psychic doctor." This hair-raising story, A Psychic Invasion, rests on the idea that even after death the soul, if surviving from a forceful personality, can still direct mundane concerns. An "abominable woman, hanged in 1798" returns to lead a concerted campaign against the good doctor and even to carry consternation among his domestic pets. It is all a fine example of the sturdy British taste in mystery and horror.

Such a mental trend will hardly lead to success in the Canadian backwoods nor on the stony pavements of New York. Poverty and pride make misery; but misery, if articulate and unabashed, may make literature—as in the present instance. HENRY B. FULLER.

Conflicts With the Code

The Unadjusted Girl, by William I. Thomas. Foreword by W. F. Dummer. Criminal Science Monograph No. 4. Boston: Little Brown and Company. $3.00.

IN The Unadjusted Girl, Mr. Thomas has added another humanist work to the extended series for which the literature of sociology is already indebted to him. The new book is a well-ordered and carefully documented study, in which the author only now and then gives rein to the keen imagination which made his former scientific works some of the best reading that we have. This restraint, although regrettable, is doubtless self-imposed. To discuss acceptably in print the problem of the Freudenmädchen, it seems to be necessary to take the veil of a heavy-handed and leaden-footed style. In Sex and Society, Mr. Thomas stepped out far more briskly and engagingly as a writer, although the argument in the present book is more carefully built up.

The Unadjusted Girl is a study in human behavior. The author traces his theme along psychological lines. This is by far the most relevant and profitable approach and he is entirely within his rights in adhering to his own definition of his theme to the exclusion of the economic factor. But the casual way in which the economic motive is dismissed in passing raises a question at least in the mind of one who has observed the revival of prostitution along the Nevsky Prospect under the influence of the New Economic Policy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the rapid recruiting of the ranks along the Friedrichstrasse as the German mark plunged downward into nothingness. After all there must be a vital connection between economic pressure and wage-earning immorality, although the investigators as a rule cannot deduce it from the evidence of the girls themselves. "In spite of the bad economic conditions, apparent here and in any report on prostitution," says Mr. Thomas, "it is remarkable that very few girls ever allege actual want or hunger as a reason for entering prostitution." Not less remarkable is the statement which occurs later in the same chapter, that "in a few cases girls yield to their own sexual desire." The deponents apparently want to have it both ways. Behind every act, even the most primitive, there is a variety of motives. Life is not so simple as the questionnaires assume and a similar inquiry among bourgeois matrons would probably show that remarkably few of them had married for support. So far as I know, Mary Wollstonecraft is the only woman on record who acknowledged herself to be capable of so base a motive.

In the present study the author pursues a theme which he has previously handled from many and various angles. It is the struggle between the autonomous personality and the autocratic group. The Unadjusted Girl is one of the outposts, so to speak, of this inevitable conflict. Her unadjustment is not essentially different from that of the counterfeiter and the hobo. Moreover, she resembles in some respects every pioneer who shocks the stability of his environment by introducing new values, material or spiritual. On many occasions society has shown itself unable to discriminate between the counterfeiter and the prostitute on the one hand and those individuals on the other hand who introduced the iron plow or a new theory of the solar system. These are not misleading resemblances, Mr. Thomas points out, but a real kinship which a more scientific understanding of human behavior will teach us how to utilize. "When we have sufficiently determined causal relations," he writes, "we shall probably find that there is no individual energy, no unrest, no type of wish, which cannot be sublimated and made socially useful. From this standpoint the problem is not the right of society to protect itself from the disorderly and anti-social person, but the right of the disorderly and anti-social person to be made orderly and socially valuable."

The individual about whom the argument revolves is a creature who is driven by certain primary wishes. These desires, according to the author's definition, are Jenseits von Gut und Böse and only assume a moral or immoral aspect according as they tend to find satisfaction in ways which are sanctioned or condemned by organized society. But organized society includes, for example, such widely divergent authorities as Dr. Austin O'Malley and the physicians who answered so variously the inquiry sent out by the Social Hygiene Board concerning the advisability of absolute continence for the unmarried. This is only one of many illustrations which show that the code is only relatively fixed after all, and tends to become less and less so under modern conditions of life. Few young persons lead such a sheltered existence that they are not forced to make an early choice between sharply opposed standards. The individualization of behavior therefore becomes not only more possible but more essential for survival. "The chief obstacle," says Mr. Thomas, "to the growth of a science of behavior has been our confidence that we had an adequate system for the control of behavior in the customary and common sense regulation of the wishes of the individual by family, community, and church influences . . . if only we applied the system successfully. And the old forms of control based on the assumption of an essential stability of the whole social frame-work were real so long as this stability was real. But this stability is no longer a fact." The sacred traditions in which it was once possible to take refuge are actually not available. The norms themselves are changing, and this is especially true of life as it is lived by women. They inhabit a new social and economic world in which the norms of their grandmothers would, if literally followed, in some cases lead to utter and irretrievable ruin.

Many readers will be interested in the first chapter of this book, which contains a discussion of the wishes of the individual. Mr. Thomas agrees with the psychologists, mystical and scientific, who affirm that the wish is the basis of character. But he has a new theory to propose of how many primary wishes there are and what the individual wishes for first of all in his existence. In folklore he was always allowed to have three wishes. Then Freud came along and cut him down to two. Trotter added the herd instinct and made the count three. Watson by a different method altogether came out tentatively with three major wishes. Thomas submits a list of four, which he defines as: (1) desire for new experience; (2) desire for security; (3) desire for response; (4) desire for recognition. In explaining these four desires, he derives them from the three major emotions of the behaviorist scheme, fear, rage, and love; or rather, tests them out by this series with which he wishes to bring his own scheme into fundamental agreement. With the Freudian theory, he has less in common. He suggests, for instance, that in the unsatisfied desire for recognition lies the main source of those psychopathic disturbances which Freud treats as sexual in origin. Society alone, says Mr. Thomas, operating through public opinion, is able to confer status on the individual. According to Freud, not only the great society but also a mere humble human being of the opposite sex is able to confer status on the individual. But since Mr. Thomas is interested in social psychology and not in sexual psychology, this aspect of the matter does not arrest his argument.

In short, the Unadjusted Girl is treated from a thoroughly humanist and behaviorist point of view. The exigencies of sex only qualify—they do not determine her problem. For the purposes of this study, she becomes a more or less promethean type motivated by four kinds of wishes in which sex plays a minor part. Mr. Thomas is chiefly concerned to unite her emotionally with the rest of mankind. He strives consistently and expertly to show that those who win social approval and those who win social disapproval often belong to the same type. "A clean and protected moron is not far from corresponding to the ideal woman of the Victorian age." And any scientific explorer, even the greatest, Pasteur for example, has something of the vagabond in him. Between those who produce social values and those who destroy them there is not the thoroughgoing difference which morality assumes. It is necessary to shuffle all the cards again, to reassimilate the castes separated by taboos, before we can begin to understand why some people turn out badly and others turn out well. "If we attempt to determine," says Mr. Thomas, "why the call of the wild prevails in one case and the call of home, regular work, and 'duty' in the other, we do not have different problems but aspects of the same general problem." In this book Mr. Thomas focusses his attack on those unscientific categories of the moralities which block the way to a really scientific control of behavior.

KATHARINE ANTHONY.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some Books on Art

The World of Roerich, by Nina Selivanova. New York: Corona Mundi. $1.50.

FOR those who are interested only in the exuberant and imaginative paintings of Nicholas Roerich this book is not needed; the main interest here is biographical, for it is not only Roerich the painter, but Roerich the archaeologist, Roerich the mystic, Roerich the centre of a school of thought and art who is depicted. This is a compendious guidebook to an interesting, possibly a profound, personality; but it has the great defect of the guidebook—it conveys no adequate notion of the subject.

Boston Days of William Morris Hunt, by Martha A. S. Shannon. Boston: Marshall Jones Company. $5.00.

THIS book is made timely by the hundredth anniversary of Hunt's birth, on March 31, 1924. It gives a glimpse of the background of Boston during the sixties and seventies, in contrast to the swart figure of Hunt himself, newly returned from his conversion to Millet and the works of the Barbizon School; and it reminds us of the struggle which Hunt survived and Henry James succumbed to, in the days when expatriation was almost the inevitable price of remaining an artist. The illustrations from Hunt's great mass of pictures—depleted though they were by the Boston fire—are excellent; and the type-page is a delight.

A History of Art, by Dr. G. Carotti; revised by Mrs. Arthur Strong. 540 illustrations. Vol. 1: Ancient Art. Vol. 2: Early Christian and Neo-Oriental Art; European Art North of the Alps. Vol. 3: Italian Art in the Middle Ages; Art in Upper and Southern Italy. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. $9.00.

DR. CAROTTI'S work is a key to the cities of the past and the museums of the present: a Baedeker which introduces the reader to the art itself rather than to the thoughts and divinations that have produced it. Its compact form, its numerous thumbnail photographs and plans, and its wealth of factual detail make it a valuable work of reference, particularly since it also treats of architecture and the minor decorative crafts.

On Making and Collecting Etchings, edited by E. Hesketh Hubbard. New York: Boni & Liveright. $4.00.

HERE is an excellent handbook which should deepen the appreciation of those who already collect etchings, awaken the interest of the amateur, and, perhaps, contribute a trick or two to those who already practice this, the most crafty of the arts. While not exhaustive, these papers by various members of the Print Society of England cover every aspect of etching, from process to appreciation.

Pictorial Beauty on the Screen, by Victor Oscar Freeburg, Ph.D. New York: The Macmillan Company. $2.50.

A SINCERE but pretentious study of the aesthetic values in the motion pcture. On the critical side its work is admirable: Dr. Freeburg has no difficulty in showing that earlier directors spoiled their work by vicious lighting, meaningless, overloaded compositions, and disconcerting byplays. Unfortunately, the positive prescriptions for pictorial beauty on the screen serve little better than similar directions for the graphic artist: balance, pattern, harmony, and symmetry are the results of aesthetic taste rather than the creators of it. Is there any artistic salvation in the movies outside the mathematical theory of probabilities; namely, that in every thousand compositions snapped, twenty will perhaps have aesthetic value? Dr. Freeburg's prescriptions will, at best, ensure that the remaining nine hundred and ninety achieve a decent mediocrity.

The Proverbs of Goya, by Blamire Young. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. $2.50.

THIS is an ingenious commentary on the collection of Goya's prints known as the Disparates or Proverbs. By dint of interpretation, biographic detail, and facile conjecture Mr. Young has pieced together a philosophy whose factitious character does not altogether undermine its interest. A great many of these drawings can, however, be enjoyed quite heartily apart from any intellectual comprehension; and it is unfortunate that the works of this saturnine Blake have here been reproduced on paper whose poor quality takes away some of their graphic value.

The Enjoyment and Use of Color, by Walter Sargent. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. $2.50.

THIS is a textbook by a professor of art education at the University of Chicago. It deals with the composition of color, the psychology of color, with the artist's palette, with complementaries, harmonies, and what not. Amid its many useful suggestions and experiments there is something of interest for everyone from the amateur decorator to the lover of landscape. Its appeal, however, is narrowed by the fact that it is cut and dried on the lines of a formal textbook. L. M.

Contributors

JOHN W. OWENS has for a number of years been a political reporter on the Baltimore Sun.

EUNICE FULLER BARNARD, a graduate of Smith College, has written two books, one in collaboration with a Columbia professor, a history of American discovery, to be brought out this fall; the other a collection of folk tales published by the Century Co. She was also director of historical research for the exhibit, America's Making.

DAVID FRIDAY, professor of economics at the New School of Social Research, has carried on extensive statistical studies in the United States Treasury Department and has had wide experience in the appraisal of public service corporations. He is author of Profits, Wages and Prices and numerous articles on economics in scientific and general magazines.

ALDOUS HUXLEY, a graduate of Oxford, was formerly on the editorial staff of the Athenaeum and later dramatic critic of the Westminster Gazette. Among his books are The Burning Wheel, The Defeat of Youth, Limbo, Leda, Crome Yellow and Mortal Coils.

MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, Ph. D. in anthropology, Columbia University, is at present engaged in research on the problem of Variability under Racial Crossing. Mr. Herskovits has published numerous book reviews in recent periodicals and various scientific papers in anthropological and sociological journals.

EDMUND WILSON was formerly on the editorial staff of Vanity Fair and later of the New Republic.

HENRY B. FULLER has written novels of middle western life and stories of Italian travel.

KATHARINE ANTHONY is the author of Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia, and Margaret Fuller: a Psychological Biography.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Each Serves Its Community

In Frazer, Colorado, a log cabin of three rooms shelters a telephone exchange that connects with the mountain homes of cowmen, miners, homesteaders and tie-cutters. In the heart of New York City a new building of twenty-nine stories is to become the home of several metropolitan central offices serving some 120,000 telephones. This building will contain, as well, offices for executives and for engineering, commercial, plant and accounting forces, providing space for over 7000 telephone workers.

Each of these buildings helps to render adequate and economical telephone service in its own community. They stand at the extremes in size, equipment and personnel. Yet they both indicate the nation-wide need for adequate housing of the activities of the Bell System; and they illustrate the varied ways in which that need is being met. One of the largest single items of plant investment of the Bell System is real estate, comprising nearly 1700 buildings acquired, with their sites, at a cost of $180,000,000.

It is continuously the aim of the Bell System to construct and so to situate each new building—whether executive office, central office, storehouse or garage—so that it shall serve its community with the utmost efficiency and economy, and remain a sound investment throughout its period of life.

AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY
AND ASSOCIATED COMPANIES
BELL SYSTEM
One Policy, One System, Universal Service

The Deportations Delirium of Nineteen-Twenty

By LOUIS F. POST

Assistant Secretary of Labor of the U. S from 1913 to 1921.

Senator Thomas J. Walsh, writing in the New Republic, says of this book: "It is a ringing indictment of both the American government and the American people—the former for acts of heartless oppression, compared with which the Acadian dispersion was a mild-mannered performance, and the latter for the indifference with which the most hideous injustices perpetrated by high officials in perfect contempt of constitutional guarantees were regarded."

Cloth, 352 pages, $1.50 postpaid.

Charles H. Kerr & Company, 349 East Ohio Street, Chicago

DOCTOR HAVEN EMERSON
will lecture on
The Effect of War on Child Life in Europe
on Thursday, March 20th at 8.15 p.m.
New School for Social Research
465 West 23rd St.
Tickets $1.00, on sale at the School and at office of Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 299 Madison Ave. Vanderbilt 2659.

Brentano's Inc. NEW YORK 5th Ave at 27th ST
Booksellers to the World
Mail-Telephone Cable-Telegraph
ALL BOOKS ALL LANGUAGES
New York-Chicago-Washington-London-Paris

Sell TIRES
DIRECT FROM FACTORY
We want one auto owner in each locality to use and advertise Armour Cords. You can make big money and get your own tires Free by simply sending us orders from friends and neighbors. No Capital or Experience needed. We deliver and collect direct. Pay you daily.
Most Liberal Tire Guarantee Ever Written
Armour Cords are Bonded against Accidental Damage, Wear and Tear, Tread Separation, Blistering, Blow-Outs and Rim-Cutting for 10,000 miles. We are actual manufacturers. Write today for Great Special Offer to Agents and low Factory Prices.
ARMOUR TIRE & RUBBER CO., Dept 562 DAYTON, O.

THE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE
COOPER UNION
8 o'clock
Friday Eve., Mar. 21—Everett Dean Martin: "Why there will always be a Militarist Party."
Sunday Eve., Mar. 23—Dr. E. G. Spaulding: "The Realm of Reason in Science."
Tuesday Eve., Mar. 25—Prof. Herbert Richard Cross: "Art in America."

A SOUTHERN GIRL with overtones of Northern education, a University degree, experience in the world of business, a cultivated aptitude for the arts, historical perspective and a vivid interest in the ways of life, desires to travel as companion or secretary to a wealthy woman or family who are leaving the American Scene this summer. Address Box 252, The New Republic, 421 W. 21st St., New York City.

The New Republic's
Spring Literary Announcement Supplement
will be published
with the issue of April 9th

Copy is required by March 26th

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VOL. XXXVIII No. 485 PART TWO

Aspects of European Life and Politics

Seven Books of History Against the Germans
HARRY ELMER BARNES

The Other France
H. N. BRAILSFORD

German Close-Ups
VIOLA PARADISE

"Reconstructing" Hungary
EUGENE S. BAGGER

Growing Pains in Russia
W. H. CHAMBERLIN

A SPECIAL SECTION OF THE NEW REPUBLIC FOR MARCH 19th, 1924

The Other France

AFTER an absence of many years I have had the good fortune to spend a week in Europe. I thought that I had kept myself fairly well informed. Every day I had read the Temps, an able though reactionary newspaper, and usually I had looked at some of the papers of the Left. As the week went on I began to realize that France, after all, is not a leading article. Instead of those well-written but acrid columns of print, a new set of symbols and associations began to gather in my mind—the warm red rocks of southern landscapes, the tall hedges of yew, the solemn gray-haired olive trees, the music of the language, the friendliness and enthusiasm of workingclass crowds, and that haunting word "republican," spoken with an odd emotional ring, which sums up a common national ideal, and conveys its memories of courage and probity. The best place I found in which to forget M. Poincaré was under the blue windows in the aisles of Nôtre Dame. For a week I set myself to meet the other France. I was reasonably lucky. I met all the leaders of the French Socialist party, heard them speak, sat with them in cafés, travelled with them in trains. In Paris, thanks to an old friend in the Radical camp for whom I have a great regard, I met several leading men in his party, including two at least who will hold high office in any ministry of the Left.

This other France is in high spirits today. It is sure of its victory in the coming elections. The National Bloc won its triumph in 1920 by an electioneering trick which cannot be repeated. It will find this time a coalition arrayed against it, which in its turn will take advantage of the technicalities of a very mischievous electoral law. A month ago the Right still had high hopes. It imagined that Mr. MacDonald would follow on the track of Lord Curzon, and would proclaim a policy of hostility to France, but in a coarser and rougher form, suited to the manners of Labor as the French Right sees it. It was preparing to fight the elections with a rude blundering proletarian England as its bug-bear. The Red peril served it very well last time. It thought that on this occasion it had only to substitute London for Moscow. These calculations have tumbled to pieces. The French public has realized almost with a shock that MacDonald is remarkably unlike the noble Marquis. The friendly and courteous candor of his words and his acts has brought a sense of relief, and startled the whole people into a responsive friendliness. For the first time since 1918 a British government has " a good press" in France. As for the democratic masses, their feeling is warmer. Each of our acts, beginning with the recognition of Russia, has told its tale. Across the fog of the Channel the face of the new Labor government has taken shape, and it is seen to be a friendly face—the face of a comrade.

The chances are then that sharp differences in the next two or three months can be avoided without any surrender on our side. Indeed, the re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sponse, even of M. Poincaré, in the matter of the Cologne railway tangle and the Palatinate, to MacDonald's friendly and human approach, has been most encouraging. One begins to suspect that half our troubles in recent years were due to Lord Curzon's personality.

In the meantime everyone is waiting for the report of the Experts' Commission. I gathered that even the Right wishes, this time, for a positive and fruitful report. Opinions reached me from governmental circles to the effect that it is realized, even there, that the commission must not break down through the extremism of the French delegates. The chief of these, M. Parmentier, is said, moreover, to be a man of independence and good sense. The plain fact is that the finances of France are now in a condition so perilous that a financial settlement is essential. If the commission were to fail, everyone realizes that another financial panic would follow; the franc would go tumbling again, and it is even possible that the small investor in France would no longer venture to lend his money for Treasury Bills. That would spell bankruptcy.

My strong impression was that, thanks to this precarious financial situation, the chances of a settlement are better than they have ever been before. On one thing Right and Left are now agreed. The aim of aims is to substitute an international loan for a direct German tribute. M. Poincaré's plan had been to stay in the Ruhr for thirty years, and on its taxable and exploitable resources to base an international loan. That plan is now almost openly abandoned. It is seen that no surplus can be got out of the occupation. It is realized that the rest of the world will not adapt itself to this plan. The idea is now to use the occupation of the Ruhr as a lever with which to extort other pledges, on which, with the assent of England and America, a loan could be based. If that can be secured, the Ruhr would be evacuated, and even in the Rhineland some scheme of demilitarization under the League might possibly be considered. Here, I fancy, Right and Left think alike. It is not a moral, or a loyal, or a merciful plan. But it does lend itself to negotiation.

Events will probably so time themselves that the decisive moment for negotiation will not arrive until after the elections are held—possibly on May 6. It will be a gain to have a new government to deal with. But we must beware of assuming that the Left really differs radically in this matter of reparations from the Right. It has taken its ground as an Opposition on domestic issues—on the mismanagement of finance, the folly of inflation, the high cost of living; on the wrongs done to pensioners, to disabled men, and to officials by the fall in the value of the franc (for even disabled soldiers, men without legs or arms, are still paid at the old rate, though the franc has lost its value); on the scandals of the compensation paid in the devastated areas; on the revival of clericalism; on the tampering with the constitution involved in M. Poincaré's scheme for revising expenditure by administrative decree. The Radicals will not raise the Ruhr as an electoral issue, and even the Socialists will fight mainly, though not solely, on domestic issues.

There is, I think, some real difference between Left and Right in their attitude to militarism. The Radicals are not obsessed, as M. Poincaré is, by the dream of the Rhine frontier. They are more friendly to the League of Nations. They have less trust in the system of alliances. But, when all this is said, I must stress the other side. I am not going to quote what I heard in friendly social intercourse. But an impression I may record. I compared the attitude of these leading French Radicals with that of English Liberals. They are not living in the same mental climate. The casual references to Germany were hard. Her "bad faith" was assumed. The Left is sensitive about its reputation for patriotism: it must not seem to be less careful of national interests than the Right. If we were to propose to entrust the settlement to the League, we should, I predict, encounter opposition. I doubt whether even the ablest of these French Radicals realizes to what extent reparations is an international issue—an issue that concerns all Europe, which means ruin or survival for us, which governs the daily life even of neutral Holland and Sweden. It is still for them a national issue. It is a French question, the question of the restoration of their devastated areas—that and nothing more. It follows, of course, that it is not a question which France would consent to abandon for settlement to the League. Plainly an immense work of explanation remains to be accomplished before even the French Left is likely to join us in any settlement which we should think satisfactory.

It is reasonable to hope something from the coming election, but we shall stumble heavily if we exaggerate these hopes. Parties in France lack the solidity to which we are accustomed. It is true that the Radicals are purging their ranks, and erecting "barriers" and tests (no less than five of them) against undesirable candidates who might stray into the fold. Socialist pressure may also help. But I heard much that was disturbing about the real forces at work behind the scenes. "Big business" is highly syndicated, and it has its "bosses" and its electoral funds—rumor speaks of about a million sterling. Iron and steel, the chemical industry (both deep in the Ruhr affair), the building trade (which has dug itself into the devastated regions), sugar and oil work together as a Union des Intérêts Economiques. It cares little for party labels. A needy provincial advocate, eager to stand as a Radical, may go to it for his election expenses, and he will get them, if he promises to be good about the Ruhr, to leave tariffs as they stand, and to oppose any genuine income

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tax. If this happens on any big scale, the Radical party will remain as divided as it is today.

In the most openly venal press of the civilized world, "big business" has its second line of defence. It is true that a better and braver "Left" press is growing—the Quotidien deserves especial praise. But the commercial press has a hundred times the circulation of these "Left" organs. Could M. Herriot, when he comes to power, defy "big business" with this press behind it? Hardly for a day. Nothing in this organized plutocratic world is left to chance. I learned, for example, that most of the press advertising in France is rationed out to newspapers by a single agency (Havas). That form of pressure alone could bring most editors to heel. Opinions in this modern world do not grow: they are bought and organized and sold. Chambers and senates, parties and elections are only the façade. The hope of a change lies less in the elections, than in the pressure of economic necessity, which may convince even "big business" that a policy of economic militarism cannot be built on a tumbling franc.

To see the world as realists, and yet to keep the driving force of our own ideal—that is the test for Labor come to power.

H. N. BRAILSFORD.

London.

"Reconstructing" Hungary

WHAT with the appointment of the first Labor government of Great Britain, its recognition of Soviet Russia, the vogue of boiling in oil live statesmen in America, and roasting live separatists in Germany, the highbrow minority that habitually worries about international affairs finds no time to get excited over such minor matters as the proposed Hungarian reconstruction scheme, involving a mere trifle of fifty million dollars and the fate of a steerage nation of less than ten million souls. And yet this scheme, on its face a commendable extension of the principle that has produced such excellent results in Austria, involves a phase of European politics well worth a moment's reflection.

In a catalogue of the dozen first-rate causes of the present European chaos the loans of French capitalists to Tsarist Russia would surely be listed. The implications of the French loan policy are too well known to require restatement. It was a policy indefensible morally and disastrous practically. It not only provided one of the most corrupt and contemptible political systems of all times with the means of carrying on, but it built up a powerful vested interest vitally concerned in the safety of that system. It forced French statesmanship into one of the most vicious circles in modern history. It might be an interesting problem to figure out just what proportion of the youth of Allied nations who fell in the late war believing that they were fighting for democracy shed their blood because the French bourgeoisie had gambled on the future of Russian imperialism.

And yet, perilous though this policy was in its consequences, France could plead one valid excuse. She needed the military support of Russia against Prussian militarism and the German birthrate, and she had to pay the price.

On an infinitely smaller scale the proposed reconstruction loan to Hungary follows closely this vicious precedent. This loan would go, not to help the defeated and stricken people of Hungary onto its feet, but primarily to bolster up a counter-revolutionary military régime that has earned the condemnation of progressive opinion throughout the world; that is recognized by those who care to examine the facts as one of the gravest potential menaces of Central European stability, such as it is; and whose only sympathizers are to be found among the gentlemen who still believe in the authenticity of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The transaction would mean not only an initial and temporary help to an essentially bad cause, but the formation of a vested interest in the future of that cause. In view of the logically inevitable foreign policy of Horthyist Hungary it would impose further military burdens on Hungary's neighbor states, much to the satisfaction of the militarist cliques in those states. Finally, it would put the final sanction upon the bonds between France and the most important member of the Little Entente, Czecho-Slovakia. The view, held generally enough in England and America, that the Little Entente is a mere tool of French militarism has so far been unjustified. On the other hand, it is possible to suspect a connection between the recent French-Czecho-Slovak treaty and the emphatic support given to Hungary by the late Conservative government of Great Britain in the matter of the reconstruction scheme.

That these facts are not clearly recognized is due to an assortment of causes, beyond and apart from the concentration of world interest by larger problems. First of all, the issue itself is hopelessly confused, and this confusion is cleverly manipulated by the Hungarian government, that expert in the oriental art of riding two horses simultaneously. There is in the liberal circles of Great Britain a most praiseworthy sentiment favoring assistance to the defeated nations, and Count Bethlen plays it for what it is worth. At the same time he cashes in on conservative sympathies claimed on the ground that his government has defeated Bolshevism. Second, a parallel with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Austria is invoked by partisans who do not stop to explain that the success of the League reconstruction campaign in that country may have something to do with the latter's eminently democratic constitution, capable and honest administration, and with its high level of popular intelligence. Third, the advocates of the Hungarian plan exploit the attitude of the British Labor government toward Soviet Russia. It has been argued in favor of recognition that it is not for the British government nor for the British people to sit in judgment over the internal policy of another country. Count Bethlen's friends now plead that what is sauce for the Red goose is also sauce for the White gander. The logic of the situation forces even such an enlightened interpreter of international affairs as the New Statesman into an editorial statement to the effect that "the rule of the Magyar oligarchy is the affair of the Hungarian people alone; but their foreign policy is the affair of all of us." Unfortunately (or fortunately) no such watertight division of a government's behavior at home and abroad is possible. From the Punic wars to Poincaré, so history teaches us, the foreign policy of any régime has ever been a function of domestic exigencies.

Were it possible to regard the scheme as a purely economic proposition, free from political implications, the case in its favor would seem sound enough. According to the report of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, its main features may be summarized as follows:

1. Stoppage of inflation with a view to the stabilization of the Hungarian crown.
2. Establishment of an independent bank of issue, having a monopoly of the note issue.
3. Balancing the budget by June 30, 1926; thereafter current expenses to be met entirely out of taxation.
4. The raising of a reconstruction loan of about $50,000,000, to cover the budget deficit until June, 1926, so that inflation may be stopped and the balancing of the budget thereby facilitated.
5. The loan to be secured by specific Hungarian revenues (including customs, the state monopolies in salt and tobacco, and the earnings of the Hungarian State Railways).
6. The appointment of a Commissioner-General by the Council of the League to control Hungarian finance for the purpose of ensuring the due execution of the reform program.

The Committee recommends suspension of all payments in reparation during the reconstruction period, apart from certain coal deliveries to Jugoslavia, amounting to about $1,000,000 a year. These are already included in the present budget, and they will cease in 1926. Thereafter it is proposed that reparation payments shall be limited for the next twenty years to yearly maximum average of about $2,000,000, the scale of payments to rise gradually.

Unfortunately it is impossible to regard this scheme in an economic vacuum, as it were, apart from its political consequences. These consequences would involve strengthening the position of the present government of Hungary, partly through the direct effects of the assistance obtained, partly through the increase of its domestic prestige. It therefore seems necessary to examine, briefly, the character of the government thus to be assisted.

The charter of the present Hungarian government is the agreement concluded in November, 1919, with Sir George Clerk, representative at Budapest of the Allied powers. By this agreement the counter-revolutionary government of Admiral Horthy was given international recognition. This recognition was not unconditional. It was stipulated that a coalition government, including moderate Social Democrats should be formed, and that free and impartial elections be held at the earliest possible moment.

How this initial pledge was broken immediately on Sir George Clerk's departure has been repeatedly told. Two Social Democrats were nominally included in the Cabinet, but their status may be judged from the fact that they were prevented by the police from delivering electioneering speeches in their constituencies. The "free and impartial elections" were refereed by machine gun detachments, with the result that a National Assembly of immaculate whiteness was returned. Under the thin disguise of constitutionalism the White Terror of Horthy continued to hold its sway.

But the shelving of the Clerk agreement was not the only breach of trust committed by the Horthy régime. The first National Assembly had been elected, nominally at least, under the universal suffrage law promulgated by the short-lived Republic of 1918. Count Bethlen, who succeeded Messrs. Huszar, Simonyi-Semadam, and Count Teleki as the fourth Premier of the Regency, was loath to take a similar risk. In the summer of 1922 the elections for the second Assembly were held—under a suffrage amended not by act of Parliament but by ministerial decree. About one third of the electorate was deprived of the vote by cunningly contrived restrictions. Worst of all, Count Bethlen's measure substituted open polling for the secret ballot in all but a small fraction of the constituencies. The import of this innovation is indicated by the fact that the twenty-four Social Democratic deputies who succeeded in squeezing their way into the Assembly were elected without exception in the districts where secret balloting was retained. The gendarmerie and the Fascist contingents of the Awakening Hungarians saw to it that no such accidents should happen in the constituencies where the polling was open.

Such are the constitutional foundations of the present government of Hungary, a kingdom without a king, ruled in the name of a non-existent sovereign by a Regent who, after his accession to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

power under a Legitimist banner, proceeded to arrest his lawful lord and to deliver him to his foreign gaolers. It is a régime that can be best described as an interregnum made permanent, a petrified provisionalism, a stationary counter-revolution. Today the worst excesses of the White Terror have ceased. A prominent Hungarian, fresh from Budapest, remarked to me the other day: "No, we haven't a White Terror any more —all we have is half a dozen political assassinations and a massacre or two a year." Everything in Hungary has been stabilized, including the outrages. But if the White Terror is less terroristic than it was in 1920, it is also infinitely better organized.

Still, it may be argued that all this has no bearing on the proposed reconstruction scheme—that the nations of the West, desirous of aiding the Hungarian people in restoring normal conditions, have to deal with the Hungarian government as the available representative of the Hungarian people. The rejoinder to this is, first, that the Hungarian government of today does not represent the Hungarian people. The legal aspects of its tenure have been examined above. Its ascendency is in reality founded on the simple physical fact that on the collapse of communism the Rumanian invaders disarmed the entire population, except the detachments of Admiral Horthy's White army, which was at the time under French protection. Whereas in other countries government is backed by the theoretical possibility of coercion by arms, in Hungary it is backed by the naked reality of such coercion, by the monopoly of machine guns and rifles held by a small group. Furthermore, the Allied powers, through their envoy, Sir George Clerk, have become parties to a contract which the Hungarian people was led to regard as the charter of its liberty, but which was immediately treated as a scrap of paper by one party and immediately forgotten by the other. Through the signature of Sir George Clerk the Allied powers have assumed a liability in behalf of the Hungarian people which they have never attempted to discharge.

There is no need of doubting the benevolence of some of the British supporters of the Hungarian reconstruction plan, though the fervent sympathies poured upon Count Bethlen's government by Lord Curzon may be ascribed to motives other than eagerness to accommodate a defeated enemy. The paramount objection to the scheme in its present form is not that it goes too far by way of reconstructing Hungary, but that it does not go far enough. Its main significance lies in the opportunity it misses. By demanding that the Hungarian government should live up to the Clerk agreement, holding without delay and under League supervision those "free and impartial" elections which were not held in 1920, that scheme might form a basis of a genuine reconstruction of the Hungarian state. Imposing this condition would not constitute interference in the domestic affairs of Hungary—only exacting the fulfillment of a previous international pledge. Such a course would be parallel to that pursued in regard to Russia, in whose case financial assistance is made contingent upon the recognition by the Soviet government of obligations assumed by its predecessors.

Short of containing such a provision the Reconstruction Scheme may bolster up the prestige of the Bethlen government, it may galvanize Hungarian economic life into a brief semblance of normalcy, but it will be sure to fail in reconstructing Hungary. For the supporters of the plan, in their insistence upon dissociating economic from political considerations, disregard the all-important point that the economic success of their action is inseparable from its political guarantees. The avowed object of the fifty million dollar loan is to balance the budget and to stabilize the Hungarian currency. But at present the yearly deficit of the Hungarian government approximates thirty million dollars. Obviously a loan of fifty millions cannot, even under the most ingenious administration, afford any but a makeshift relief. The only effective way of balancing the budget in the long run is by increased taxation. Now the only national asset of Hungary that will physically bear increased taxation is land. But the one thing that the Bethlen government—a government of landed oligarchy, if there ever was one—will not do is to increase the taxes on land. That measure would be the denial of its own raison d'être. It might just as well abdicate in favor of Count Karolyi.

And here we have arrived at the crux of the Hungarian reconstruction problem—the crux of *all* Hungarian problems: the land question. No reconstruction scheme will reconstruct Hungary that does not bear account to that question. The budget will not be balanced, the loan will not be repaid, unless the landed estates are adequately taxed. But the landed estates will not be adequately taxed except by a legislature that is truly representative of the Hungarian people—a legislature elected on the basis of universal suffrage with secret ballot and every guarantee of a free expression of preferences. But the present Hungarian government, which has plenty of machine guns amidst a disarmed population, will not hold such elections of its own free will. It will do so only if it is made to—if it is compelled to execute the Clerk agreement. For this the Reconstruction Scheme offers an opportunity.

It seems at the moment of writing that this opportunity will not be utilized. Whatever the plans of the Labor government be in regard to Hungary, none of its members has so far expressed himself on the subject. The preliminaries are practically completed, and it is possible that Mr. MacDonald's predecessor at the Foreign

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Office has left behind commitments too definite to allow reconsideration. To be sure, approval by the interested governments does not mean that the transaction is closed. The governments undertake no guarantees, as they did in the case of Austria. The loan will have to be floated in the open market, and the investing public will subscribe according to its financial merit.

Not a little depends on the personality of the League Commissioner to be chosen. If he is the proper kind of person he may exert a most beneficial influence on the course of things at Budapest. International supervision there may not bring about radical changes for the better, but it may prevent the grossest abuses.

One still needs proof that the entire European structure has not already been damaged beyond hope of repair. The mere emotional certainty that it cannot be means nothing. It is a superstition inherited from the nineteenth century which prided itself on its historic sense. There is probably a star somewhere in the blueblack void, and not so very far from our earth as stellar distances go—a star wherefrom Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia and Rumania, or Germany and France and Britain, for that matter, are undistinguishable from a rollicking party of Kilkenny cats.

EUGENE S. BAGGER.

London.

[Note.—Since the above article was written the Reparations Commission has given its approval to the Reconstruction Scheme, waiving the priority of its claims on the national assets of Hungary in favor of the proposed loan. This means that the scheme has gone through and the next step will be the appointment of a Commission and the actual floating of the $50,000,000 loan.—E. B.]

German Close-Ups

KATIE came after school, on days of the week when she was not attending her communion class. She ran errands for us, and sorted our photographs and films, and mended our stockings. On her first afternoon we asked,

"How much sugar in your tea?"

"Oh—no sugar."

"That's strange. Most little girls like sugar!"

"I—I've never tasted it."

Katie was a baby when the war began, and cannot remember sugar. There are several adult workers in her family—workers who Germany's upper classes say are getting all the luxuries. But they have long since given up even margerine. Bread and potatoes is their diet; and what passes for coffee. And the baby gets one quarter litre of milk a day. Katie laughs when we offer her milk. Only babies drink that.

Katie was meant to be fat and rosy. Sometimes patches of color come into her dull cheeks.

. . .

The paper had to be trimmed to fit into your typewriter. The man at the stationer's began to wrap the inch-wide strips that had been cut off, with the rest.

"Oh, never mind that."

"But you would not waste it! With paper so dear!"

"Oh no, of course not," you explain apologetically.

At home you throw it in the wastebasket. But it is brought back to you by the considerate chambermaid. "See, you almost threw it away!" she exclaims. "And," timidly, "maybe the Damen would be so kind not to crumple the paper thrown away." There are often good edges her little brother could use in school.

. . .

We ask the waiter about an unfamiliar Gemüse on the menu. He disappears, and presently a white-bearded scholar approaches, adjusting his pince-nez. He speaks in only slightly accented English. "You inquire about this vegetable?"

"Oh, you are very kind—"

"It is somewhat like your turnip in flavor, but it is not a root. It is not of the mustard family." Follow Latin botanical terms, and then the startling conclusion, in a matter of fact voice,

"Do you wish to order it?"

We are taken aback. "Oh, the waiter—"

"No matter. He is taking care of my table. We often exchange."

We give our order in embarrassment. "But surely," one of us explodes, "you sound more like a scientist than a waiter!"

A moment's pause. Then he says, "The lady is astute. My life—before—was devoted to science. Now it is easier to sustain life serving vegetables than teaching them. . . . A little fish, perhaps? It is excellent today . . ."

. . .

Another waiter, less polished, more ironic. "Is this all? You have not the usual hearty appetite of your countrymen. Americans eat well in Germany."

Annoyed, we indicate a nearby table groaning with food, and gutteral with appreciation from the fat overdressed feeders. "Surely those are Germans?" we suggest to the waiter. "You do not resent the appetites of your native profiteers?"

"Na!" His tone is between impatience and disgust. "I am no socialist. At least they are *Ger-*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mans. It is good to see *some* Germans getting something. Instead of foreigners, with their money. Pardon. But Germany was different when we had a Kaiser. Then margerine did not cost—But you must excuse. I forget that I am a waiter. Will you have something to drink with your order?"

. . .

The students in the late winter afternoon class at the Conservatorium enter through the dark courtyard, up dimly lighted stairs, and through halls where sometimes they must feel their way; for fuel must be conserved. They keep their coats on, too, the rooms are badly heated. But the former thrifty glory of the Conservatorium is kept alive by the fire of young ambitions and enthusiasms, and now and then a stream of sweet sound.

The four students are grown young women, but each one—except the American—curtsies when she shakes hands with the teacher. There is a shaking of hands at coming, and at going; and sometimes even in the middle, if occasion warrants.

Today one student apologizes: she has forgotten her notebook, has no music paper. The American student quite casually tears a few sheets from the back of her notebook, and offers them.

"But no! I—I could not accept it. Paper! Music paper! It costs so much! Really! And you have *torn* it out!" She accepts only under pressure a fraction of a penny's worth of paper. No matter what happens to the mark it still has its old value in her eyes.

. . .

When an accident happens in Berlin, scatter, vanish. Otherwise you will be held as a witness, which is not without its compensations: An auto accident, smashed wheels. An American saunters up to regard the scene. Suddenly he realizes that he is alone,—except for the active participants. He must come along as a witness, the police insist. The Black Maria—or rather its German equivalent—is here. "But I am an American!" he repeats. At the station they ask him questions, he answers persistently in English. "I know nothing about it, I am an American." Over and over. It is obviously true, no one denies it. At last he may go. Only first there is something to pay,—a few million marks. "But why?" It is for the ride to the station in the Black Maria.

. . .

A pleasant American business man, on a year's leave of absence, having "a grand time." No money worries, his dollar buys so much. Some adventures, too. That time for instance when he offered his seat to an old lady in a Berlin street car, and a pompous blond gentleman popped into it. No American could stand for that. He explains to the man that the seat had been offered to the lady. A stony glare. Then his strong right American hand grasps the pompous blond by his shirt front, draws him from the seat, holds him amazed, sputtering, outraged, until the timid old lady has her place. Now the dumfounded German finds his tongue. "Sir! Do you not realize who I am? In the Kaiser's army, I was an officer! I am a retired Army Officer!"

"You may be all that, buddy," says the American in a good humored tone, "but you're no gentleman."

Two German workmen from the other end of the car leave their seats to come and shake hands with the American for his brave act.

. . .

Her brows are high with puzzlement, and mixed guilt and pleasure. She is going shopping, she is obeying her husband, and has the pleasure of buying clothes and clothes. And yet they have not a penny in the bank. It can't be right.

But what a pleasant quarrel that was with her husband. She had said, "If we are so rich then, I will buy eggs, and make a cake." "Rich! Eggs!" he had retorted. "Are we Krupp, that you say such things? With Germany ruined, without a cent in the bank, my wife talks yet of eggs. You'll be buying butter next!"

"But the children do not need the clothes—"

"No, it is the big sizes you must buy. And a new coat for you. Durable, not stylish. Something to last. Then we can sell it later, if we need food. Nothing foolish. Save, save, save! All my life I saved. And then the mark—ach Gott! Ten thousand marks I saved for my old age, and now it won't buy a crumb of bread! Now there is only one way to save, that is to spend."

No, it did not seem right to spend the money. But it was, oh, it was delicious! A new coat!

. . .

Back in the hotel lobby two Americans are talking. "How these Germans whine. Ridiculous. They keep telling you how much margerine is a pound. Why, I bought the most beautiful leather bag for two dollars. In America it would have cost fifteen! And you can get the best dinner for a dollar or less—everything!"

"It gets on my nerves," said the other, "the way the shopkeepers keep urging you to buy any old truck. 'In your money it is less than a dollar,' they keep saying. And then they seem mad that we can buy at all. But just watch them toady to their own German profiteers!" "Yes, and look at the automobiles, and the people in theatres and restaurants. All this talk of poverty is nonsense. Just to get out of paying the indemnity. Why at the opera you see people who look like tailors! And if a few of them are poor, well, they shouldn't have started the war. That's what I say to them now, when they complain. 'What did you start the war for, then?' I say."

"Pretty good. Say, how much is the dollar today?"

VIOLA PARADISE.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Growing Pains in Russia

LAST spring one of the Russian papers published a cartoon showing a pair of scissors with the blades widely extended. The higher blade was labelled Manufactured Goods, the lower one Farm Products. A figure representing the Soviet power was shown trying to force the blades together.

This cartoon conveyed a very accurate idea of the economic crisis that is the dominating, overshadowing fact in Russian life today. The problem of closing the scissors has temporarily taken precedence over everything else in public interest and attention. It is now dominating the internal discussion that has been going on with so much liveliness within the ranks of the Communist party during the last few weeks. In the beginning this discussion turned on the question of how to make the party organization more democratic and more responsive to the sentiment of the rank-and-file. Now this issue has been pushed into the background and the debate centres around various economic issues, all more or less linked up with the supremely important problem of restoring the balance between the prices of industrial and agricultural products.

On the surface and in the cities the effects of the crisis are scarcely visible. On the contrary in many respects there has been a great and noticeable economic improvement since I first came to Russia twenty months ago. A good deal of repairing and clean-up work has been done. Larger and larger stocks of goods are appearing in the shop windows. Industry and trade show many signs of revival. The development of the state industries is no longer hampered by the financial crises and fuel crises which characterized the early stages of the Nep. The introduction of a stable currency medium in the form of the chervonetz has made possible the establishment of an internal credit system and helped to overcome the difficulties of carrying on business with the constantly depreciating paper ruble. Gone are the days when the shortage of fuel was so acute that even the railroads were sometimes only provided with reserves calculated to last for a few days. The figures for coal and oil production have recently shown a gratifying upward turn.

Industry as a whole is distinctly on the mend. The growth of production in some branches of the textile industry since the inauguration of the Nep has been phenomenal. The metal industry, especially in the Ural district, has taken a distinct turn for the better. The deficit in the transportation system is being steadily cut down. Foreign trade is growing in volume every month, and foreign firms are gradually beginning to extend badly needed credit for the Russian state export operations.

With all these favorable signs it is not surprising that some casual visitors to Russia who spend their short time of sojourn entirely in Moscow go out with rather rosier pictures of the country's economic condition than the facts warrant. One should not, of course, go to the other extreme of undue pessimism and minimize the real and solid progress that has been made or discount the hopeful factors in Russia's future development. But at the same time it would be unwise to overlook the warning uttered several times by such a responsible authority as Nikolai Lenin's successor Rykov, President of the Supreme Economic Council, that Russia is now passing through the most serious crisis that has developed since the introduction of the new economic policy.

In supporting this contention Rykov mentioned two facts which are of primary importance in judging the present situation. Seventy percent of the sum of Russia's industrial production is now consumed in the cities and towns, in spite of the fact that the urban population of the Soviet Union, in round numbers is only twenty millions, as against one hundred and ten million country dwellers. Furthermore the amount of land planted in Russia this year is little, if any larger than the figure for 1922. Of course the amount of cultivated land is still far below the prewar figures.

Now these two facts reveal an ominous break between the city industries and the peasant agricultural producers. As Rykov points out, the Russian industries are really working largely for a restricted city market, which cannot absorb their products, even at the present limited rate of production. What has become of the vast mass of peasant consumers, who should furnish the backbone of buying power for the city manufactured goods? They have simply gone on a gigantic buyers' strike. Where they can, they make their own clothes and boots out of their own flax and wool and leather. Travellers who have recently visited the Russian villages report a general return to the methods of hand production which prevailed two or three generations ago. In some cases the rusty tools which were buried long ago are being dug up and put to use again. The peasants' consumption of such articles as tea, sugar, salt and kerosene has shrunk appallingly. They are burning pine torches instead of lamps and one often finds dried fruit peelings used as a substitute for tea. Sugar and salt have become luxuries. The boycott of the impossibly expensive city goods is widespread.

The break between the peasants and the city industries has two sides. Receiving less from the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cities the peasant is showing a disposition to give less. Unable to be a consumer, he has little incentive to produce more than he may require for his immediate needs. In a recently published review of the outlook for Russia's foreign trade Krassin, while noting a number of favorable developments, declared that the scissors represented a serious menace to the enlargement of Russia's export program for farm products. Unless the present situation is corrected Russia must reckon with a repetition, in somewhat milder form, of the conditions of 1920 and 1921, when the peasants practically forced the government to go over to the new economic policy by refusing to raise any appreciable grain surplus for the cities.

It may be inquired why the Soviet government, which exercises such a close supervision over Russia's economic life, permitted the present crisis to reach such serious dimensions. To some extent, no doubt, it was powerless in the face of circumstances. Agriculture, as was natural, revived more rapidly than industry and transport. In view of this fact it was inevitable that, once the famine was over, the scarce industrial products should command relatively higher prices than the more abundant farm products. The export of grain was organized with a view to counteracting this tendency; but the efficacy of this remedy was diminished by high costs of transportation and warehousing and the low price of grain on the world market.

At the same time, as is now generally admitted, mistakes of judgment on the part of the government contributed to the aggravation of the crisis. Due partly to considerations of political expediency, partly to the Marxian instinct to strengthen the collectivist industry at the expense of the individualist agriculture, the government, in its reconstruction program, devoted almost all its attention to the needs of the cities, leaving the country districts to shift more or less for themselves. A special bank was set up for the purpose of financing industry, and the credit resources of the State Bank were largely placed at the disposal of industry and foreign trade. But it is only recently that the proposal to establish an agricultural bank has been put forward. The chervontsi, the stable banknotes, circulated almost entirely in the cities, while the villages were compelled to deal in the constantly falling paper rubles.

Many factors combined to handicap the peasant in carrying on profitable exchange with the cities. He was hard hit by disproportionately high transportation costs, which sometimes made it more economical to transport grain by horse and cart than by railroad. More, perhaps, than any other class of the population, he suffered from the conspicuous incapacity of the government in the field of organizing and regulating retail trade. The failure of the state to organize any effective distributive system left him at the mercy of profiteering private traders: for his coöperatives, for the most part, were small and weak. Moreover, the function of the Russian coöperatives as important buying agencies for the state has hindered them to some extent in serving the consuming public. It has led to a rather bureaucratic form of organization, in which goods must pass through several organs, the central coöperative organization in Moscow, the provincial coöperative, the county coöperative before they can get from the state factory to the peasant buyer. Each organization naturally piles up overhead costs which are passed on to the ultimate consumer. Moreover, the peasant must pay his full share of the cost of Russia's experiment in socialized industry, of the graft and mismanagement which are the inevitable by-products of the present difficult transitional period, when the best Communists are, unfortunately, not as a rule the best industrial administrators.

As a result of all these factors prices of manufactured goods in the Russian country districts are almost prohibitive. "We would have to work a year to buy two shirts," said one old peasant at a meeting in the Peasants' Home in Moscow. According to a report on village conditions which was recently published in one of the Moscow papers, the sack in which the peasant puts his grain is sometimes worth more than the grain itself. Sugar, which costs fifteen to twenty cents a pound in the largest cities is sold for prices ranging from thirty to forty-five cents in the provincial centres and costs still more when it reaches the villages.

Late in December the Tseka, or Central Committee of the Communist party published a resolution on the economic situation which is a model of clear thinking and plain speaking. The gravity of the crisis is recognized; and the resolution twice calls attention to the possibility that the discontent of the peasants may lead to serious consequences, politically as well as economically. The basic fact that the Russian industry cannot develop, or even survive unless it conquers the peasant market is driven home. Starting from these premises the resolution suggests a number of remedies which should be applied either immediately or in the near future.

The poor peasants are to be given "broad privileges" in the matter of paying taxes. An agricultural bank is to be established, and a large quantity of agricultural machinery that has been lying idle in warehouses because the peasants cannot afford to buy it, is to be turned over to the peasants on easy credit terms. The state is to establish fixed prices for certain articles of general peasant consumption, such as sugar, salt and kerosene. The heads of the state industrial and trading organizations are warned to pay more attention to the needs of the consumer and to content themselves with minimum profits in the future.

One may offer two closing observations on the present situation. In the first place the crisis must be diagnosed as a severe case of growing pains,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rather than as a spasm portending imminent dissolution. Russia's hardest times are over. The railroads and essential industries have recovered notably from their state of almost complete collapse. The present crisis, while serious and menacing enough, is concerned not with basic production, but with the subsidiary processes of distribution.

It is interesting to observe that the Soviet government has so far shown no disposition to capitulate on any of its fundamental economic principles in an effort to find a solution for the scissors problem. The resolution of the Tseka affirms in the most emphatic way the intention to maintain the monopoly of foreign trade. Most of the suggestions for change are pointed in the direction of stricter state control over industry and trade. The powers of such organs as the Gosplan, or State Planning Commission, the body which works out schemes for the direction of Russian economic life are to be enlarged. Furthermore there is an evident determination not to solve the crisis in the approved capitalist fashion, at the expense of the city workers. Rykov, the old revolutionist who heads the Supreme Economic Council, could boast with honest pride: "We have not closed a single factory or dismissed a single worker on account of the crisis." The Tseka is convinced that the crisis can be and will be overcome by searching out and eliminating the elements of waste and inefficiency in the present system of production and distribution. The Russian Communist party has entered this economic life-and-death struggle with its colors nailed to the mast.

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN.

Seven Books of History against the Germans

WHILE other goddesses and muses have doubtless wilfully and brazenly perpetrated more voluntary amorous achievements and episodes than Clio, it will hardly be denied that the latter has been compelled to bestow her favors unwillingly and under protest far more frequently than any of her more fortunate sisters. Her purity has been sacrificed innumerable times in the interest of state, party, religion, and family throughout the ages since the Hebrew Jahvists of the ninth century before Christ performed the obstetric services that secured her parturition from folk-lore and mythology. Her fair form has been ravished by compensatory Jewish exaggerators of the wealth and prestige of ancient Israel, by Greeks boasting of their superiority over oriental "barbarians," by patriotic protagonists of the Roman republic, and soured critics of imperial developments and policies, by pious but prevaricating Church Fathers, by apologists of Guelphs and proponents of Ghibellines, by Papist and Lutheran, by Prussian and Gallican, by Anglo-Saxon and Hibernian, by Whig and Tory, Republican and Democrat. No race, state, party, creed or sect has failed to avail itself of her helpless condition and defenceless situation. But she has weathered these indignities of millenniums, gathered an ever increasing body of more worthy devotees, and, at the opening of the twentieth century, appeared far more coy and seductive than when, in short dresses, she was ogled by the Greek Logographoi of the seventh century before our era. While the World War caused her to fall from grace and indulge in the dizziest and wildest debauch of her entire career, she gradually gave evidence of penitence and contrition, regained poise and respectability, and seems now well on the way to secure the devoted and untiring attention of the most ardent and competent group of admirers of whom she has ever boasted, most of them determined that hereafter her amours shall be only voluntarily bestowed solely on those whose offerings at her shrine merit her attention and gratitude.

Of all the influences which have assailed Clio's integrity and diverted her from the path of rectitude the most powerful has been war. The classic examples usually selected by teachers of historical method to illustrate the prejudices and biasses of historians have been the accounts of the great conflicts of the ages. Herd impulse in the face of a crisis appears to have been the most potent of all unbalancing factors. The enormous progress of historical scholarship and objectivity between the Franco-Prussian war and 1914, however, inclined many to the hope that in the event of another calamity of this sort, the historian's poise and professional serenity and pride would triumph over state, nation and party. This aspiration and supposition was cruelly and roughly wrecked by the onset of the World War. In every country the greatest of historians behaved like clerks or shopmen in the capitulation to herd pressure and hysteria. The example was set by Eduard Meyer, by common consent the greatest of living historians and probably of all that have lived, but he had a great flock of worthy imitators in every modern state.

Still many hoped that with a cessation of hostilities objectivity would return, and their aspirations have in some degree been realized. A number of historians have shown a laudable desire to know the truth about the origins of the war and have made real progress in this direction, aided by the unprecedentedly rapid revelation and publication of the pertinent documents. But the progress in making the facts known to any large body of readers through general manuals summarizing the conclusions of technical monographs has been slow. Professor E. R. Turner's two works are conspicuous examples of our disappointment in this regard. Until success in this matter is achieved, however, we shall continue to harbor the myths and delusions that were current in 1917-18, will fail to recognize the futility and needlessness of the horrible tragedy of 1914-18, and will be fatally handicapped in any concerted and intelligent effort to prevent a recurrence of such a cataclysm. Hence the historian who essays to inform his countrymen concerning the origins of the war assumes a heavy and serious responsibility of the highest educative and moral significance. The dangers inherent in a failure can perhaps best be realized by an analysis of a concrete example, and we are fortunate in having just been presented with the most pretentious manual on Modern European History which has yet been published in English, one which is bound to be accorded a wide and varied acceptance and adoption, and will doubtless help to shape the historical opinions of several hundred thousand citizens of the United

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States concerning the most absorbing, if gruesome, topic in modern history, and the new order which is beginning to arise out of it.

The author of this work* is the successor of William Milligan Sloane in the chair of Modern European History at Columbia University, a Chevalier de la Legion d'Honneur, and Professor in the University of Strasbourg in 1920-22. He has been a notable producer of books in his field. In 1897 he brought out an interesting and suggestive work on Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution. Twelve years later appeared his most important work, Europe Since 1815, a comprehensive college textbook. This was condensed and an introductory section on the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era prefixed to constitute his Modern European History, which was published in 1917. The introductory portion also appeared separately this same year in an edition de luxe as The French Revolution and Napoleon. He also brought out in 1917 a snappy little volume on Alsace-Lorraine under German Rule. In 1919 he published the sections of his Modern European History on the period since 1870, together with an additional chapter on the World War, as Fifty Years of Europe. This chapter on the war was later appended to the Modern European History, which, with some other minor additions, appeared in 1920 as Modern Europe. The present work is an extension of the original edition of the Europe Since 1815 to include the material from the Modern Europe on the period from 1909 to 1919, and much additional information on Europe since 1919, which is far the most notable phase of the revision. In addition to these works, Professor Hazen has edited several valuable compilations including one on the Kaiser versus Bismarck. While dealing with all the major states of modern Europe, Professor Hazen's chief interest has been in the history of England and France, particularly the latter. So warmly has Professor Hazen espoused the cause of France that one commentator has remarked that his series might well be called, reminiscent of Orosius, Historiarum Adversum Germanos Libri Septem.

Of these books the Europe Since 1815 has been much the most significant and serviceable. It combined a discriminating selection of material previously available in English only in such voluminous and somewhat tedious manuals as those by Fyffe, Seignobos, Andrews and Rose with clarity and an easy familiarity of expression, and constituted a well-nigh ideal textbook on the internal political history of Europe during the last century. Written fifteen years ago, when respectable historians in Europe and America stated explicitly or implied by the organization of courses in their departments that pertinent, relevant and reliable European history ceased upon the landing of Napoleon at St. Helena, the book was something of a pioneer and a salutary historical therapeutic. It proved an unmitigated blessing to the few original and independent history teachers who quite rightly perceived that, for an understanding of contemporary European politics, the history of Europe since Waterloo is more significant than the record of events from Sargon of Agade to the Duke of Wellington. It was, of course, almost wholly narrative political history, and since 1909 the synthetic tendency and the interest in economic, social and intellectual history, as evidenced in this field by Beard, Fueter, Hayes, Ogg, Schapiro, and others, have rendered Professor Hazen's outlook somewhat antiquated. But there will always remain a place for political history, and there is no evidence that Professor Hazen's book is likely to be displaced as a text in this field on the period before 1914 by anything now available or on the horizon.

Space will not allow a detailed summarization and estimate of the contents of the original book, which is itself now a matter of history, but some brief comment may be made on the nature of the revision. Professor Hazen gives evidence of the effect of infection from the contagious contact with Professors Shotwell, Beard and Hayes at Columbia, and of a recognition of the general shift of historical interests in the last generation, by adding new chapters on the Industrial Revolution and the development of modern social reform programs. There is, however, little attempt to work out a synthesis of economic, social and political factors and influences, and the book still remains primarily a treatment of political and diplomatic history rather than a synthetic effort like that of his colleague Professor Hayes. Beyond bringing the material down to 1923, there is little change in the chapters as originally published in 1909. The chief alterations consist in making somewhat more evident, ex post facto, the German menace to the world from 1890 to 1914. He has made use of his crisp pamphlet prepared for the Creel Committee on Public Information to emphasize the undemocratic nature of the German government before the war, which aroused the unbounded enthusiasm of not a few American college presidents and exchange professors. German naval ambition, foreign policy, colonial expansion and business methods are presented as bent upon world domination, and a threat to all free and self-respecting peoples. All of these were rendered the more dangerous because of the eccentric, egoistic and domineering character of the Kaiser. Perhaps the most novel paragraph is that in which the coöperation between the German government and German business is stigmatized as disruptive of world peace. "The German will to conquer, by fair means or by foul, could only in the end arouse the determination of other peoples to defend themselves. The latter would not be willing permanently to acquiesce without a struggle, and in an attitude of impotence and resignation, in their own strangulation by a power bent on Germanizing the world."

The reader's interest and curiosity will, quite naturally, be centred upon Professor Hazen's treatment of the period since 1914, and, in particular, upon his analysis of the origins of the war, the Peace Treaty, reparations and the Russian Bolshevik revolution and social and economic régime—in other words those episodes, issues and movements which best test the accuracy and objectivity of the historian. Professor Hazen's first discussion of the origins of the World War appeared in his Modern European History, the preface of which is dated January, 1917. Here, as might be expected, the story is the familiar one credited by the great majority of historical scholars at that time. Germany, the bully of Russia in 1908, with her eye on the domination of the Near East and Mesopotamia, encouraged Austrian aggression in the Balkans, which, planned for 1913 but mysteriously postponed, drove the Serbians to the border of desperation and led to the murder of the Archduke in June, 1914. In the subsequent relations between Austria and Serbia Germany "backed Austria from start to finish," if, indeed, she did not instigate the Austrian policy, the details of which were known from the start and warmly approved by the Kaiser and

* Europe Since 1815, by Charles Downer Hazen, Ph.D. Two Volumes. New York: Henry Holt and Company. $8.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his ministers. Austria forthwith proceeded to attempt an unprecedented bullying of a weak and peaceful state, presuming, as in 1908, upon Russian cowardice or hesitation. Russia, however, this time refused to be bluffed out of playing the benevolent and disinterested part of big brother to her tiny Slavic kinsman. Thereupon Germany precipitately declared war upon Russia, thus necessitating participation by a hesitant, peace-loving and defenceless France, which was led to intervene more in the interest of the preservation of European civilization than because of binding obligation, the Entente not being an alliance but only a courteous understanding among gentlemen, though there is implicit recognition of the force of the Franco-Russian alliance. England, however, was fettered by no agreement whatever with either France or Russia; she was perfectly free to act as she might choose. Her entry was brought about by the dastardly invasion of Belgium, a crime against international decency and honor which could never have been contemplated, much less executed, by any state save Germany. The case and the issues were so clear that the overwhelming judgment of the world was immediately expressed as to the primary and sole responsibility of Germany and Austria for the terrible cataclysm, and this verdict was rendered permanent and irrefragable by the action of Italy. This state, hitherto thoroughly enamoured of Germany and Austria, refused to sell her honor by joining with her allies of the Triple Alliance in a war of spoil and territorial aggrandizement; later she entered the crusade of the righteous wholly free from material ambitions.

This epic may well be forgiven, for we possessed in 1916 but the most incomplete knowledge concerning the outbreak of the war, and even the Potsdam Conference was accepted by the majority of historians, though as early as 1914 it was known that England was morally bound to join France and would have done so irrespective of the invasion of Belgium. Indeed, the reviewer in the summer of 1917, at the instigation of several historians of international reputation, aided a bullet manufacturer in preparing for the National Security League almost as absurd and misleading an account of the background of the war as that which appears in Professor Hazen's text. The same version of the coming of the great conflict is repeated almost without the slightest verbal change in his Fifty Years of Europe, where there is added a brief survey of the course of the war, which, as he tells us, was finished "on the day the armistice was accepted and which therefore represents only incomplete knowledge and hurried impressions of a mighty moment in history." This modest apology was apparently intended to apply only to the history of the war and not to the account of its origins, as the same narrative appears for a third time in the Modern Europe, which was published in 1920. In the interval of two years there had appeared, among other significant material, the published Secret Treaties of the Entente, the Kautsky Documents, Gooss's important work on Austrian policy and the origins of the war and his voluminous Austrian Red Book, Pribram's Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, and a flood of controversial works containing much illuminating information. Professor Sidney B. Fay was also beginning his epoch-making series of articles, which for the first time made available for English and American readers the implications of the above material.

Still, one could find cause for a good natured tolerance towards Professor Hazen. He could allege that his book was intended for high school students and college freshmen and that he had not yet been able to find time to sift the new evidence. His friends expectantly awaited the revision of his Europe Since 1815 to discover a carefully digested and impartial analysis of the onset of the war, in the first detailed manual on modern European history written by a professor of established position and leisure, and late enough to allow the production of a perfectly definitive judgment and exposition. Their hopes were badly, if not fatally, chilled through a review by Professor Hazen of Schevill's Political History of Modern Europe, which appeared in the Political Science Quarterly for June, 1922. Professor Schevill had made good use of Fay's articles, and his account of the genesis of the war is probably the fairest and clearest to be found in the same number of pages in any book which has thus far appeared in our language. Of this admirable summary Professor Hazen wrote "It would have been better had the three new chapters never been written, for they present a view of the causes of the war which would be much more appreciated in the schools of Germany than in those of the United States" (Sic!). Professor Hazen is apparently determined to be "appreciated" in the schools of his country, for, in spite of another year of grace and the advantages of European travel and study, the reader of the revised Europe Since 1815 discovers to his dismay, if not to his astonishment, that he is presented with the fiction of 1916 as dispensed in the Modern European History, with scarcely a change of word or punctuation. The only noticeable alterations are the inclusion of the substance of his review of Schevill's book and the change of a "v" to "b" in the spelling of Serbia.

This is not the place for a summary of the historiography of the World War since 1920, but even a brief enumeration of the more important work done will indicate the enormity of Professor Hazen's offence in submitting in an advanced manual an account of the origins of the war based solely on materials available in 1916. Friedjung has revealed by using the secret unpublished documents how preposterous a misconception we formerly entertained concerning the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria in 1908. Instead of Russia's being frightened off by an arrogant German Kaiser in "shining armor," she took part through Izvolsky in the negotiations over the annexation, giving her consent in return for the promise of Austro-German pressure on Turkey for the opening of the Straits to the Russian army. And not only did Izvolsky take part in the negotiations; it was he who put the idea in the Austrians' minds by suggesting that they annex these provinces. And Germany averted the Austrian attack on Serbia in 1913. Fay proved very clearly that Austria had been the aggressor towards Serbia in 1914, that Germany had been only very meagerly informed concerning the terms of the Austrian ultimatum before its delivery, that Bethmann-Hollweg when he read its contents thought it far too strong, that the Kaiser and his Chancellor regarded the Serbian reply as satisfactory, and did everything possible to localize the conflict. He also proved that the Russians took the ultimatum to Serbia as a declaration of war, and began preparatory mobilization measures against both Germany and Austria. Gooch goes even further and contends that the Tsar's order to suspend mobilization, in answer to the Kaiser's request, was intercepted by the Russian militarists, though this is still a disputed point. Much more material has since come out on the Austro-Serbian situation. Baron Szilassy has shown that Berchtold was but a weak-willed tool, pliant in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hands of Conrad von Hötzendorf, the war party and sympathetic functionaries in the foreign office. Hötzendorf has frankly admitted the long standing and ill-concealed ambitions of the Austrian general staff for a war with Serbia. Heinrich Kanner has clearly implicated the diplomatic representatives of his country and proved their primary responsiblity for aggressive action towards Serbia. Most astonishing of all, a Serbian scholar, Stanojevič, has recently revealed the fact that the assassination of the Archduke was planned under the direction of the chief of the intelligence bureau of the Serbian general staff, a fact apparently not known to Berchtold in July, 1914. Not a few impartial historians have admitted that the integrity of the Dual Monarchy depended upon a firm and vigorous attitude towards Serbia in 1914. We certainly made war on Spain, and intervened in Mexico on a far slighter pretext.

With respect to Russia, the Siebert Documents, Paléologue's Memoirs, Marchand's Livre Noir, and the recently published analysis of the Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book, present an overwhelming indictment of Russian imperialism, aggression, and zeal for war in 1914. They further make it clear that Russia took the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia as a declaration of war, and that the war was really *on* from that moment. The Russian attitude rendered futile any attempt at delay and arbitration. These documents also reveal the close collusion between the Russian militarists and the French group led by Poincaré. Izvolsky admits the Russian bribery of the French press, the sordid details of which have recently been revealed in L'Humanité, in the New Republic and in the Nation for February 6, 1924. In regard to England, the Siebert Documents have shown her involvements with France and Russia, particularly with the latter in the Near East, and her conversations with Russia in regard to naval union and action against Germany. Grey has confessed his agreement to intervene to protect the coast of France irrespective of the German invasion of Belgium; Haldane has boasted that the plans for landing English troops on the continent had been worked out and settled for a decade prior to 1914; and Churchill has admitted that from 1912 onward the navy began to prepare for a war with Germany in both a psychological and material way. Finally, the Belgian archives reveal conversations regarding the possibility of landing English troops on Belgian soil in event of a war with Germany, and one of Sazonov's reports to the Tsar contains a promise from the English king that England would sink every German merchant ship she could lay her hands on in the event of war. For France one does not need to turn to Bausman's demonstration of the persistent French military tradition, to Gouttenoire de Toury's indictment of the French war party, commended by Charles Seignobos, to Pevet's damaging examination of the evidence for aggressive French policy in regard to the origins of the war or to Poincaré's weak apology. Ample material to eliminate once and for all the myth of a helpless, terrified and reluctant France, as far as those in control of her policy are concerned, is available in such sober collections of documents as the Siebert Documents, the revelations in regard to the falsification of the Russian Orange Book, and, above all, Marchand's Livre Noir. They prove Poincaré and his group willing by 1913 to risk a general European war in order to recover Alsace and Lorraine. Further, Demartial has described the manner in which the French war party deluded the majority and induced them to accept the fiction of a defensive war. France was unquestionably an alert partner in the Franco-Russian alliance in the years from 1909 to 1914, probably the more aggressive of the two after 1912. Finally there are ample Belgian documents proving that Belgium feared an invasion by France quite as much as by Germany in the case of a European war, and France had apparently considered this eventuality as defensive strategy.

Little information has subsequently come out regarding Germany designed to alter seriously the interpretation worked out by Professor Fay on the basis of the Kautsky Documents, though there has been plenty to corroborate it in the works of Valentin, Haller, Hammann, Montgelas and others. The fact of the autocratic government, militaristic tradition and imposing armament on land and sea remains unimpaired, something we are often in danger of forgetting in the midst of absorbing interest in the newly revealed documents, but the thesis of a deliberate German plot against the peace of the world in the summer of 1914 does not have the slightest support, though there is evidence that the German leaders were thoroughly worried in May and June of 1914 over the Anglo-Russian Naval Convention and the tightening of Franco-Russian encirclement, and recognized the necessity of prompt action in the event of an impending attack. Germany and England appear to have been the only states honestly desirous of peace in 1914. Finally, the case for Italy's entry into the war in the sole interest of cosmic justice was set tottering by the publication of the Secret Treaties, and has been pulverized by the recent revelation of the documents in the Russian archives bearing on the Italian dickering with the Entente from July 1914 to her entry into the conflict. The fact that Italy had made a secret treaty with France in 1902 not to engage in any war upon the latter greatly reduces the validity of Italy's non-participation in 1914 on the side of the other members of the Triple Alliance as a test of her judgment of the guilt of Germany and Austria.

Much of the above material was sifted and analyzed by Professor Charles A. Beard in the introduction to his Cross-Currents in Europe Today, and a magisterial synthesis of the whole literature, forecast in his admirable brochure on the diplomatic revelations, has appeared in the recent history by Professor G. P. Gooch, which is declared by no less an authority than Archibald Cary Coolidge to be far the best work on the diplomatic background of the war that has appeared in any language up to the present moment. On the basis of these revelations the arrogance and insolence of Mr. Asquith's recent work is no less than appalling—almost as disconcerting as the discovery that Professor Hazen lists many of the above collections and monographs in the bibliography appended to his chapter on the war.

It is in the light of the above researches and disclosures that one can best comprehend the grotesquely misleading nature of such a statement as the following:

> The responsibility for this tragic, monstrous, unnecessary crime against civilization, against humanity, was lightly assumed. . . . The opinion of the outside world as to where that responsibility lies has been overwhelmingly expressed. . . . The world was stunned by the criminal levity with which Austria-Hungary and Germany had created this hideous situation. The sinister and brutal challenge was, however, accepted immediately and with iron resolution by those who had done their utmost during those twelve days to avert the catastrophe, and not only great powers like France and England, but small ones like Belgium and Serbia, never hesitated,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but resolved to do or die. That the contest was not merely a material one, but that the most precious moral and spiritual interests were involved, was clearly seen and stated at the very beginning of the war by the responsible statesmen of France and England. In those early days, Mr. Asquith, prime minister of Great Britain, expressed the common resolution of the Western Powers when he declared: "We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed." A cause dedicated to such aims as those was worthy of the supreme sacrifice it would piteously exact. . . .

Had England rendered no other service than this of making the seas safe for freedom and dangerous for despotism, the debt of humanity to her would be incalculable. But she was doing far more than this. The utterances of her statesmen, like those of France, from the first of August, 1914, defined the issues at stake, and set forth adequately the appalling gravity of the crisis. Not only were those utterances profoundly educative but they were veritable trumpet blasts, summoning to action, in the interest of all that men in Western Europe and in America had long held most precious. In the darkest hours, and there were many such during those first three years, there was no faltering in high places, no talk of compromise of right with wrong, no weakening of resolution, no abatement of effort. It must never be forgotten that the leaders of France and England, and the nations they represented were constant and valorous defenders of the New World as of the Old, that it was their heroism and their immeasurable spirit of sacrifice that barred the way of a mighty and conscienceless military power toward universal domination. Never did men die in a holier cause. And they died in enormous numbers, literally by the million.

As might be expected, Professor Hazen has little patience with those who advocated objectivity on the part of America in the face of this cosmic dualism—who counselled hesitation in our joining the forces of Ormuzd against the devilish hosts of Ahriman:

> In such a contest as that the United States belonged, body and soul. If she was to preserve a shred of self-respect, if she was to maintain inviolate the honor of the American name, if she was to safeguard the elementary rights of American citizens, if she was bound in any sense to be her brother's helper in the defense of freedom in the world, then she must take her stand shoulder to shoulder with the hosts of freemen in Europe who were giving and had long been giving the last full measure of devotion to that cause, then she must spend her manhood and her wealth freely and without complaint, as France and England and Belgium and Serbia had done.
>
> From very early in the war there were Americans who endeavored to arouse their country to a sense of its danger and its duty, to persuade it to prepare, to fire it with the resolve to keep the nation's 'scutcheon clean. Among those who, by their quick and intelligent appreciation of the situation, by their courage and activity, rendered invaluable service in the campaign of national education were Ex-President Roosevelt and General Leonard Wood. Many Americans enlisted in foreign legions.
>
> From August, 1914, to April, 1917, America passed through a painful, humiliating, and dangerous experience. Her declaration of war was the expression of the wisdom she distilled from that experience. Her entrance into the war was the most important event of the year 1917, though not immediately the most important, for the collapse of Russia, occurring also in that year, had a quicker and more direct bearing upon the military situation. But in the end, if America kept the faith, she could tip the scales decisively.
>
> We entered the war finally because Germany forced us in, because she rendered it absolutely impossible for us to stay out unless we were the most craven and pigeon-hearted people on the earth. Any one who counted on that being the case was entertaining a notion for which he could certainly cite no evidence in our previous history.

Professor Hazen can at least claim the virtue of consistency. He carries the epic through with logical, if brazen, thoroughness. The 1917 stories of German frightfulness and submarine atrocities are repeated in full and without the slightest qualification. Admiral Sims is apparently regarded as untrustworthy. God's rebuke to the Kaiser and Ludendorff was no less apparent and certain than it was to Sennacherib before Jerusalem. The Peace of Versailles left little or nothing to be desired as an instrument of absolute and impartial justice and constructive international statesmanship. "The place chosen for the Peace Conference was appropriately Paris, which Meredith once called 'the goddess of the lightning brain,' 'valiant unto death for a principle' and which had been the nerve center of the Allied cause, the throbbing heart of the coalition, from the first day to the last of the racking struggle." The offspring was like unto the place of parturition. Not even the reparations as originally determined come in for a mild word of doubt or disapproval—except for a protest later on in regard to German failure to pay them in full. There is no sympathy for Germany, or suggestion of injustice or inconsistency in regard to the Fourteen Points. "Time has brought its complete revenge" for Prussian aggression in 1870. "The drastic provisions, if executed, will destroy that German militarism which has cost the world so intolerable a price." "By the Treaty she accepts the responsibility of herself and her associates for all the loss and damage to the Allied governments and Allied peoples caused by the war. But as the payment of so monstrous a sum (the actual war loss, not the stated reparations) is quite beyond her and their resources, she is to escape from a large part of what would be only a just penalty." One will obtain from his pages no intimation whatever that the very question of reparations from Germany is now as anachronistic as witchcraft or astrology in the light of the well established facts concerning the origins of the war. Even Poincaré has admitted that proof of divided responsibility for the outbreak of the conflict would carry with it inevitably the acceptance of the principle of the division of the costs of the war among all participants. The objective, unbiassed and disinterested opinion of Lloyd George is introduced as a final and definitive proof of the justice of the Peace Covenant. (pp. 760-61)

Unfortunately, some of the parents of this beautiful child refused to accept the responsibility for her maintenance. Petty politics in the United States and sordid materialism in England have prevented her from being nourished into robust youth. This has forced France into other policies to compensate her for the loss of the support of the United States and England. "Guarantees of a military nature France must have, and this was her most poignant pre-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

occupation at the Conference of Paris; and reparations, too, have an obvious connection with national security." She has attempted to gain compensation and security by alliances with the new powers of central and eastern Europe. "The international influence of the Republic is stronger and more commanding than it has been in a long while. The power and prestige of her eastern neighbor no longer overshadow her. The most authoritative voices in the councils of Europe are those of France and England. France is the most active and powerful defender of the treaties upon which the new order of the world rests, and as such she is the natural ally of the states of central and eastern Europe who find their title deeds in those very treaties. One of the members of the Great Entente, her connections with the Little Entente are close and are likely to become still closer. French diplomacy has a wider field than ever for constructive achievement. German models and methods are destined to enjoy a lesser vogue, and a renewed radiation of French influence has begun." The occupation of the Ruhr as an example of this "radiation" is heartily approved. "What the French did was to seize the most valuable single asset of the defiant and slippery debtor." It will be noted that he has made no attempt to draw the parallel between French atrocities in the Ruhr and German atrocities in Belgium. Nor is anything said about corruption and graft in the French private claims for reparations funds.

Many reflections are suggested by this book and its methods. Professor Hazen can be forgiven for his pro-French attitude. The reviewer shares this bias, at least as regards the traditional and semi-mythical France, which is the France of Hazen. Those things for which France is supposed to stand: tolerance, contempt for sordid and compensatory Puritanism, an appreciation of the aesthetic, cultural pluralism and diversity, antipathy to regimentation, and resistence to mechanical industrialism and unbounded fecundity attract me as much as I am repelled by the mass production, quantitative standards, bigotry, superficiality, regimentation, insistence upon conformity, and the worship of a dizzy birth-rate, which characterize the typically industrial and bourgeois civilizations, such as those of Germany and the United States. Yet one's subjective estimate of cultural and psychological values is no adequate basis for the rejection of historical facts. Again, while it is difficult for a reviewer to be certain of the spiritual advantage or desirability of subordinating a great moral passion to the exigencies and requirements of prosaic facts, yet the growing disposition to do this is what has constituted the progress of historical method and scholarship from the time of the composition of the Book of Chronicles to the work of Sorel and Gooch. And when a reputable historian refuses absolutely to take cognizance of a vast mass of first-hand source material which has completely revolutionized our knowledge of what he himself regards as the greatest crisis and episode in human history, we clearly have a case of "criminal levity" which is beyond the scope or competence of the historical critic and must be referred to the psychiatrist with his proficiency in dealing with such mechanisms and complexes as the flight from reality, compensation, projection, defense-mechanisms, the Jehovah complex and the fixed-idea.

Perhaps the most astonishing thing about the book is that it appeared under the editorship, and, hence, with the apparent approval, of Dean Charles Homer Haskins of Harvard University. Now concerning the scholarship of Professor Hazen there are differences of opinion, with neither extreme of which would the reviewer care to align himself, but with regard to Professor Haskins there has been no question as to erudition and scholarship. It is no exaggeration to say that no historian has yet lived who has been better prepared technically for the study of history, who has given evidence of a more keen, discriminating and objective scholarship, or who has been more uniformly rigorous in applying scientific historical methods in his own monographic researches. Yet the reviewer can say from personal knowledge that if a candidate for the degree of master of arts in Harvard University had submitted in Professor Haskins' course on historiography a paper on the causes of the Hundred Years' War, which ignored the sources as thoroughly as does Professor Hazen's account of the origins of the World War, this student would not only have been dropped from the class but also from the graduate school. And when we reflect that even the most scholarly of historians have to depend for source material upon contemporary authorities who were invariably less adequately trained than Professor Hazen and often more subjective, we are almost driven to the conclusion that there was no little validity in the dictum of the wizard of the flivver concerning the nature and utility of history.

One fact and recommendation is beyond cavil, namely, that the publishers are under a moral obligation to arrange for a thoroughgoing revision of the second volume by some such person as Professor Coolidge, Professor Langor, Professor Kerner or Professor Schmitt ere it misinforms and perverts the historical judgement of thousands of college students and general readers in the present and coming generations. In a general work of a popular sort, unsponsored by professional historians, the dictates of a free press would probably require the granting of poetic license even to a writer on historical subjects, but there is a greater moral obligation to approximate candor and truth in a book designed to instruct the citizenry of a democratic republic. A textbook is no place for a violent partisan polemic, however exalted the spirit of the author. Of course, some might urge in extenuation liberty of interpretation, but there are certainly limits to this concept and process, and Professor Hazen cannot take refuge here unless he is willing to share his retreat with Orosius and Carlyle, and to grant the validity of the allegorical method in historical literature.

HARRY ELMER BARNES.

Contributors

H. N. BRAILSFORD, the English publicist is the editor of the New Leader. Among his books are The War of Steel and Gold, and Russian Impressions.

EUGENE S. BAGGER is a New York journalist, formerly foreign editor of the New York Tribune. His Eminent Victorians has recently been published by G. P. Putnam's Sons.

VIOLA PARADISE has made government investigations and has also contributed articles and verse to the magazines.

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN, a graduate of Haverford College, was formerly on the staff of the New York Tribune. He has been in Russia since July, 1922, and has travelled 15,000 miles through that country. Mr. Chamberlin is now Moscow correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor.

HARRY ELMER BARNES is professor of historical sociology at Smith College, and bibliographic editor of Foreign Affairs. He is author of History: Its Rise and Development; The Social History of the Western World; Sociology and Political Theory, and several more technical works on historical sociology. He has given special attention to the problems of historical method and the history of historical writing.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Seven Days in the White House with President Coolidge

Read French Strother's Impressions of the President "on the job"

in the APRIL issue of

THE WORLD'S WORK

FRENCH STROTHER, Associate Editor of the World's Work, has just had the unusual privilege of seven days of intensive study of Mr. Coolidge under exceptionally favorable circumstances. These included personal conversations with the President; observation at close range of his habits of work during the day; an evening as only guest at the White House; a round trip on the President's train from Washington to New York and presence at the Lincoln Day Banquet at the Waldorf-Astoria, when he made his first full-length political speech since he became Chief Executive; and conversation with some of his intimate friends, all of his secretaries, and some of the press correspondents who have questioned him on public affairs twice every week since he has held his present office. From the vantage point of this intimate contact Mr. Strother has written a most vivid and fascinating article that brings the President closer to you than any previous account.

Portraits of President and Mrs. Coolidge

in FULL COLOR, reproduced from the original paintings of Howard Chandler Christy

Also in the April WORLD'S WORK

Labor's Blow to Caste in Britain, by Sir Philip Gibbs
When Cabinet Officers Become Money Makers, by Mark Sullivan
Partnership, Not Paternalism, by Samuel M. Vauclain
Have Women Got What They Want? by Clemence Dane
Insuring Domestic Tranquility, by William McAndrew
The Crimes of Coal, by Carl C. Dickey
Europe in America, by Gino Speranza
The New Defence Against Stock Promoters, by John K. Barnes
The March of Events—an Editorial Interpretation

Full Color Reproductions of Four American Prize Paintings

THE
WORLD'S WORK
for APRIL
at all newsdealers—
for $4.00 a year

FOR YOUR CONVENIENCE

Doubleday, Page & Co.,
Garden City, N. Y.

Enclosed please find $4, for which kindly send me the WORLD'S WORK for one year, beginning with the April issue.

Name .....

Address .....

.....

NR-3-19-24

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED